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Environmental policy conflicts used to be predictable. Environmental 
advocacy groups battled with regulated industries in courthouses and 
legislatures (federal and state), and governments were stuck in the middle.1 
But the emergence of complex problems, such as climate change, and of 
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 1. See, e.g., JOHN OPIE, NATURE’S NATION: AN ENVIRONMENTAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED 
STATES 448 (1998) (“Too often, it appeared, EPA’s bureaucracy moved toward regulatory gridlock as it 
tried to appease the conflicting interests of environmentalists, industry, technological viability, and 
scientific certainty.”). 
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mixed-blessing technologies, such as hydraulic fracturing and genetic 
engineering, combined with the two decades of congressional inaction on 
federal environmental legislation, has created new schisms in 
environmental law and policy. New law- and policy-making conflicts are 
pitting traditional allies against each other. The Environmental Defense 
Fund (EDF), one of the oldest environmental advocacy organizations in the 
world, is now scorned by upstart environmental groups for often breaking 
policy ranks.2 Harvard Law Professor Cass Sunstein, who served as 
President Obama’s head of the Office of Information and Regulatory 
Affairs, left government service to a chorus of praise from political 
conservatives,3 while being roundly criticized by politically liberal 
organizations4 and also by his former student, fellow Democrat and Obama 
                                                                                                                 
 2. See, e.g., CHRISTINE MACDONALD, GREEN, INC.: AN ENVIRONMENTAL INSIDER REVEALS 
HOW A GOOD CAUSE HAS GONE BAD xv–xvi (2008) (“ED[F] likes to call itself nature’s lawyer, but 
ED[F]’s longtime president Fred Krupp is seen more as corporate America’s most effective mediator on 
environmental questions . . . . [EDF] has conducted “projects” aimed at greening such companies as 
Federal Express, S. C. Johnson, and DuPont that critics say have allowed those companies to greenwash 
their images . . . . There is plenty of evidence, however, that the companies are getting more out of the 
current setup than the endangered species.”); see also Steve Horn, New Shill Gas Study Published by 
SUNY Buffalo Institute With Heavy Industry Ties, DESMOGBLOG (May 17, 2012, 14:19), 
http://www.desmogblog.com/new-shill-gas-study-published-suny-buffalo-institute-heavy-industry-ties 
(citations omitted) (“Digging deeper, the Buffalo study also had a Peer Review panel. That panel had 
five reviewers, four of five of which have ties to the oil and gas industry: . . . Scott Anderson is the 
senior policy advisor with the [EDF’s] Energy Program. As covered previously on DeSmogBlog, 
Anderson formerly worked in the oil and gas industry and is a former executive vice president and 
general counsel for the Texas Independent Producers and Royalty Owners Association. He is also a 
member of the Interstate Oil and Gas Compact Commission, which opposes extending the federal Safe 
Drinking Water Act to hydraulic fracturing.”). More recently, EDF supported a toxics regulation reform 
bill championed by the late Senator Frank Lautenberg (D-N.J.) and Senator David Vitter (R-La.), but 
was strongly opposed by other environmental organizations and a number of environmental law 
professors. Jeremy P. Jacobs, Advocates Rally Opposition to TSCA Reform Compromise Bill, E&E 
DAILY (June 12, 2013), http://www.eenews.net/eedaily/2013/06/12/stories/1059982693.  
 3. Sunstein’s admirers include the conservative U.S. Chamber of Commerce. John McArdle 
& Emily Yehle, Controversial Regulatory Chief Leaves Administration, GREENWIRE (Aug. 3, 2012), 
http://www.eenews.net/stories/1059968392. They also include Congressman Darrell Issa, the California 
Republican who has made it his calling to lambaste the Obama Administration. See, e.g., id. (“House 
Oversight and Government Reform Chairman Darrell Issa (R-Calif.), who has repeatedly criticized 
Obama for what he sees as over-regulation and made it a centerpiece of his panel’s agenda, singled out 
Sunstein as enlightened.”); Mark Leibovich, Republican Emerges as Obama’s Annoyer-in-Chief, N.Y. 
TIMES (July 6, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/07/us/politics/07issa.html?ref=darrellissa&_r=0 
(“‘You can call me a pain,’ Mr. Issa said. ‘I’ll accept that as a compliment.’”). 
 4. See, e.g., McArdle & Yehle, supra note 3 (“[B]oth Public Citizen and the Center for 
Progressive Reform came close to celebrating Sunstein’s departure, calling it an ‘opportunity’ for the 
Obama administration to drop the regulatory-reform agenda.”); Rena Steinzor, Fiddling While Rome 
Burns  64 Dead, 741 Sick, and Cass Sunstein’s Dangerous Love Affair With Cost-Benefit Analysis, CTR. 
FOR PROGRESSIVE REFORM BLOG (Dec. 10, 2013), http://progressivereform.org/CPRBlog.cfm?idBlog=
DDAD4C84-DA1D-D073-EFF093E52BB4972C (“So, for example, in their number-crunching frenzy, 
Sunstein and his fellow cost-benefit enthusiasts value the loss of an IQ point because a child is exposed 
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Administration official, Georgetown law professor Lisa Heinzerling.5 
While partisan politics have reinforced some traditional political divides, 
these new disagreements seem to represent the drawing of new fault lines. 
And the rhetoric has been so heated that these arguments among former 
allies have at times bordered on the fratricidal.6 What is going on? 
This Article argues that the nature of environmental policy conflict is 
changing and that a new kind of opposition movement is forming. 
Congressional gridlock on environmental policy7 has not stalled 
environmental lawmaking but has instead pushed it into the administrative 
realm. This change in venue has produced new reform proposals, along 
with new suspicions. Reformers have sought to inject more quantitative 
indices into lawmaking, and the new opposition has voiced doubts about 
whether these quantitative measures represent more objectivity or false 
objectivity. At the same time, the complexity of some new environmental 
                                                                                                                 
to lead paint or lead in drinking water at somewhere between $1,500-$8,400. This number is then 
discounted at the rate of seven percent annually to reflect that although children might be poisoned 
today, the damage won’t affect their earning power until they reach the age of majority. Never mind the 
affliction of going through all of one’s life with a brain diminished from what it should be . . . . In the 
end, cost-benefit analysis seems best suited for satisfying the intellectual musings of someone safely 
ensconced in an Ivory Tower, high above and far removed from the very real dangers that agencies such 
as the FDA are tasked with addressing. We’d all be a lot safer if agencies were able to go about their 
business unfettered by the fruitless search for more information geared to support various dogmas.”). 
 5. See Lisa Heinzerling, Inside EPA  A Former Insider’s Reflections on the Relationship 
Between the Obama EPA and the Obama White House, 31 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 325, 325–26 (2013) 
(criticizing the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs’ review of the EPA’s regulatory output). 
 6. See, e.g., Thomas O. McGarity, Professor Sunstein’s Fuzzy Math, 90 GEO. L.J. 2341, 2366 
(2002) (“At the end of the day, one is left with a pressing need to know why a person with Professor 
Sunstein’s obvious intelligence and even disposition would conclude that all of this occasionally 
comprehensible, but frequently preposterous and always manipulable number spinning, could possibly 
lead to better decisionmaking in the real world.”); see also Lisa Heinzerling, Markets for Arsenic, 90 
GEO. L.J. 2311, 2313 (2002) [hereinafter Heinzerling, Markets for Arsenic] (citations omitted) 
(“[Professor Sunstein] claims that the dollar benefits of the arsenic rule plausibly range from zero to half 
a billion. Undaunted by this astonishingly wide range, Sunstein argues that cost-benefit analysis is 
useful to decisionmakers because it helps them to escape the grip of “intuitive toxicologists” (that is, 
those of us who are not experts in matters of risk) . . . .”); see also FRANK ACKERMAN & LISA 
HEINZERLING, PRICELESS: ON KNOWING THE PRICE OF EVERYTHING AND THE VALUE OF NOTHING 45 
(2000) (“[A]nalysts—including economist Randall Lutter, of the American Enterprise Institute—are 
busily working to show that EPA got it wrong when it looked at the economics of banning leaded 
gasoline almost two decades ago.”). Ackerman and Heinzerling later state:  
Perhaps the most striking criticism . . . came from Robert Stavins, a well-known 
environmental economist . . . . His comments to EPA represented a dramatic 
reversal of his past views . . . By 2002, . . . Stavins was consulting for Pacific Gas 
& Electric, the giant California energy company that starred opposite Julia 
Roberts in the movie Erin Brockovich. His cautions from the 1980s about the 
limits of cost-benefit analysis were long since forgotten . . . . 
Id. at 174–75. 
 7. In this author’s view, the last significant reform being the Clean Air Act Amendments of 
1990, Pub. L. No. 101-549, 104 Stat. 2399 (1990) (codified in section of 42 U.S.C.). 
30 Vermont Law Review [Vol. 39:027 
challenges has partisans coping with their ignorance with reflexive 
skepticism and instinctive hostility to proxy enemies. Arguments over 
climate change, hydraulic fracturing, and the genetic modification of foods 
have each generated a good deal more heat than light, in part because solid 
conclusions have remained elusive. Into these knowledge vacuums have 
rushed a new genre of mass campaigns, polemics of suspicion taking full 
advantage of the dissemination powers of the internet.8 
I consider this new kind of opposition postmodern in nature because it 
has sought to undermine the legitimacy of lawmaking by arguing that it 
generates outcomes that are structurally and inherently biased. A 
fundamental postmodern objection is that neutral institutions are not really 
neutral at all but are hidden power grabs. The primary fear of this new form 
of opposition in environmental law, which I label the environmental 
postmodernists, is that changes are afoot by which special interest groups 
seek to gerrymander environmental law to their private advantage, and to 
the detriment of public health and the environment. Environmental 
postmodernists urge us to take a skeptical look at the claims of reformers. I 
call them accidental postmodernists because they make no claim that their 
opposition is postmodernist at all; they likely do not consider themselves 
postmodernist. Some environmental postmodernists are climate skeptics, 
challenging climate scientists that warn of the dangers of global climate 
change.9 Some of these industry-funded and Koch Brothers-funded groups10 
                                                                                                                 
 8. See, e.g., Joe Nocera, Fracking’s Achilles’ Heel, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 18, 2013), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/19/opinion/nocera-frackings-achilles-heel.html (noting suspicion 
about hydraulic fracturing). For example: 
Shortly after [Colorado Governor] Hickenlooper announced the proposed rules in 
a press conference, I called Sam Schabacker, the Mountain West regional director 
for a group called Food and Water Watch. He hadn’t yet read the proposed rules, 
but that didn’t stop him. These new rules were just a “smoke screen,” he said, 
designed to fool the public. E.D.F. was giving industry “a veneer of 
respectability.” Then he added, “We believe that fracking is inherently unsafe and 
should be banned.”  
Id. On the emotional nature of genetically modified foods, see, for example, Amy Harmon, A Lonely 
Quest for Facts on Genetically Modified Crops, N.Y. TIMES (Jan 4, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/
2014/01/05/us/on-hawaii-a-lonely-quest-for-facts-about-gmos.html (“Public hearings were dominated 
by recitations of the ills often attributed to genetically modified organisms, or G.M.O.s: cancer in rats, a 
rise in childhood allergies, out-of-control superweeds, genetic contamination, overuse of pesticides, the 
disappearance of butterflies and bees.”). On climate change, see discussion infra Part II.C. 
 9. See discussion infra Part II.C. 
 10. The Koch brothers, billionaire fossil fuel company owners, have donated generously to a 
number of groups with an aggressive agenda centered on sowing skepticism and doubt about the science 
of climate change. See, e.g., Eric Holmberg & Alexia Fernandez Campbell, Koch  Climate Pledge 
Strategy Continues to Grow, INVESTIGATIVE REPORTING WORKSHOP (July 1, 2013), 
http://investigativereportingworkshop.org/investigations/the_koch_club/story/Koch_climate_pledge_str
ategy/ (“Staffers from some Koch-funded nonprofit groups have continued to testify before Congress, 
2014] The Accidental Postmodernists 31 
 
would seem to have little in common with the likes of the liberal Center for 
Progressive Reform.11 But these strange bedfellows sometimes share an 
unmistakably postmodern mode of objection: to sow skepticism. 
In particular, environmental postmodernists have rallied around 
opposition to the use of cost-benefit analysis in environmental law and 
around a discomfort with the way that science is produced and used in 
environmental policy. What emerges from environmental postmodernist 
opposition in these two very different policy arenas is a shared skepticism 
of a narrative that seems to be gaining a dominant position. For those 
nervous about cost-benefit analysis, every piece of policy seems to be 
animated by a curiously opaque cost-benefit analysis. For those distraught 
over a perceived misuse of science in public policy, suspect “policy-
relevant” science12 generated under suspicious conditions, seems to usurp a 
variety of other relevant (but less objective-sounding) considerations. 
Lacking adequate access to policy-relevant science, disenfranchised 
scientists turn postmodernist. 
When environmental postmodernists resist change, a secondary 
motivation suggests itself: self-preservation. When environmental 
postmodernists on the left, composed mostly of lawyers and law professors, 
argue for a return to environmental law the way it has been traditionally 
practiced, it reflects a fear that reform may render them less relevant to law- 
and policy-making. Many reforms or changes devolve environmental 
decision-making to actors other than lawyers, such that much 
environmental law- and policy-making is made beyond the legal realm. 
Cost-benefit analyses, which can have an enormous impact on a proposed 
rulemaking, elevate the importance of economists and diminish the role of 
lawyers. Market-based reforms, like cap-and-trade, rob lawyers of 
thousands of billable hours litigating legal issues like the meaning of 
“routine maintenance, repair and replacement,”13 and deprive lawyers and 
                                                                                                                 
sowing doubt about climate change . . . .”); Robert J. Brulle, Institutionalizing Delay  Foundation 
Funding and the Creation of U.S. Climate Change Counter-Movement Organizations, 122 CLIMATIC 
CHANGE 68182 (2014) (discussing the funding of organizations contesting the need for climate change 
policy). 
 11. See, e.g., John McArdle, Progressives Bang Drums for Course Correction’ at White 
House Reg Office, GREENWIRE (May 16, 2013), http://www.eenews.net/stories/1059981294 (referring to 
Rena Steinzor as “president of the left-leaning Center for Progressive Reform”). 
 12. Policy-relevant science is distinguished from basic science in its unique relevance to a 
specific question of public policy. See infra notes 154–58 and accompanying text. 
 13. A “modification” to a facility regulated under § 111 of the Clean Air Act will trigger a 
requirement that the facility obtain a permit from EPA or a state permitting agency prior to commencing 
construction. Clean Air Act § 111, 42 U.S.C. § 7411(a)(4) (2012). However, if the facility can establish 
that the modification is merely “[r]outine maintenance, repair, and replacement,” then it is exempt from 
permitting requirements. 40 C.F.R. § 52.21 (2011). The terms have been a fertile source of litigation. 
32 Vermont Law Review [Vol. 39:027 
law professors of the opportunity to write about it.14 Understandably, 
environmental lawyers are reluctant to cede their historical domain to social 
scientists and other Johnny-come-latelies. But when environmental lawyers 
try to corral environmental law- and policy-making back onto their own 
turf, they are vulnerable to the same kinds of criticism that they levy against 
others: They are only out to grab (or preserve) power. Environmental 
postmodernists open themselves up, ironically, to postmodern critiques. 
Self-preservation aside, do environmental postmodernists nevertheless 
have a point? Reform efforts are indeed often ideological, and nakedly so, 
providing environmental postmodernists with convenient targets. But it is 
possible for environmental postmodernists to prove too much. 
Postmodernist skepticism has the effect of raising the burden of proof, 
translating negative circumstantial evidence into smoking guns. There is 
also something unsatisfying with a mode of thought that is reflexively 
skeptical, casting a negative pall over discourse, while offering little 
positive guidance. 
Some environmental postmodernists have avoided this negativity trap 
that has ensnared the traditional, French, “post-structural” postmodernists.15 
Some have argued for a “pragmatic reorientation” of policy analysis that is 
more in keeping with the notion of the policy professional as 
multidisciplinary mediator of diverse stakeholders.16 Some environmental 
postmodernists have proposed alternatives that truly seek to broaden 
process inputs rather than achieve outcomes. Principled postmodernists can 
really only support this kind of solution. Broadening the process inputs to 
                                                                                                                 
See, e.g., Shi-Ling Hsu, The Real Problem With New Source Review, 36 ENVTL. L. REP. 10095, 10100 
(2006) (describing litigation that has resulted from attempts to define terms in the Clean Air Act). 
 14. See, e.g., Robert R. Nordhaus, Modernizing the Clean Air Act  Is There Life After 40?, 33 
ENERGY L.J. 365, 374–75 (2012); Daniel E. Walters, Litigation-Fostered Bureaucratic Autonomy  
Administrative Law Against Political Control, 28 J.L. & POL. 129, 151 (2013); Thomas O. McGarity, 
When Strong Enforcement Works Better Than Weak Regulation, 72 MD. L. REV, 1204, 1205–06, 1276, 
1281 (2013) (claiming that environmental regulations are either deterrence-based or assistance-based; in 
deterrence-based regulation, regulatees are pure economic actors, while in assistance-based regulation, 
regulatees can be trusted to err on the compliance side in statutory interpretation); see also New York v. 
EPA, 413 F.3d 3, 12 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (describing attempts to redefine the meaning of “[r]outine 
maintenance, repair, and replacement”); United States v. Ohio Edison Co., 276 F. Supp. 2d 829, 850–51 
(S.D. Ohio 2003) (attempting to redefine the meaning of “‘routine maintenance, repair, and 
replacement’”). 
 15. Post-structural postmodernism is commonly thought of as the strand of postmodern thought 
that is most pronounced in its skepticism of grand assertions as power plays, and its dogmatic insistence 
on the instability of knowledge and meaning. Its tenets form a set of core beliefs for most 
postmodernists. See, e.g., MADAN SARUP, AN INTRODUCTORY GUIDE TO POST-STRUCTURALISM AND 
POSTMODERNISM 1–4 (Univ. of Ga. Press, 2d ed. 1993). 
 16. Sidney A. Shapiro & Christopher H. Schroeder, Beyond Cost-Benefit Analysis  A 
Pragmatic Reorientation, 32 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 433, 433–34 (2008). 
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law and policy development is power diffusion, and is the only kind of 
proposal that could survive the cynically postmodernist complaint that the 
purpose of every change in rules is a power grab. 
Part I of this Article will describe postmodernism and its influence in 
legal thought. Part II examines a live and persistent controversy in an area 
in which environmental reform has met with opposition from 
environmental postmodernists: the use of cost-benefit analysis (CBA) in 
environmental law. This Part also considers the evolving role of science in 
environmental law- and policy-making, and postmodern themes that are 
raised in public discourse, including those raised by climate skeptics in 
opposing the prevailing message of climate scientists. Part III of this Article 
offers a critical evaluation of the environmental postmodernist objection 
and a synthesis with what appears to be a positivist trend in environmental 
law- and policy-making. Part IV concludes with some summary remarks 
and observations on future trends and counter-trends in environmental law. 
I. WHAT IS POSTMODERNISM? 
Postmodernism is hard to define, even for postmodernists,17 in part 
because postmodernism is best understood as opposition to something, or 
skepticism towards a proposition, rather than itself an idea.18 Postmodernist 
scholars differ, but fundamentally postmodernists pose definitional 
challenges to authority and power. The postmodernist philosopher Jean-
Francois Lyotard defined the “postmodern condition” as “incredulity 
                                                                                                                 
 17. See, e.g., Dietmar Voss & Jochen C. Schutze, Postmodernism in Context  Perspectives of a 
Structural Change in Society, Literature, and Literary Criticism, 47 NEW GERMAN CRITIQUE 119, 119 
(1989) (“The participants in the discussion seem to agree on one thing: that there is the greatest possible 
disagreement as to what postmodernism is. The term itself is unspecific, unsuitable to express the self-
understanding of an era. It resists comprehensive definition and appears, at the same time, to accept 
content so arbitrary that some commentators are deluded into regarding this arbitrariness itself as an 
essential characteristic of postmodernism.”). 
 18. To some extent, defining postmodernism is oxymoronic, since a basic tenet of 
postmodernism is that attempts to generalize and describe are inherently biased by cultural specificities 
of the observer. Postmodernists are generally skeptical of pronouncements of truth and attempts to 
discern truth. See, e.g., TIM WOODS, BEGINNING POSTMODERNISM 9 (2d ed. 2009) (“Whereas 
philosophers such as Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Immanuel Kant and G.W.F. Hegel . . . placed a great deal 
of faith in a human’s ability to reason . . . [,] postmodernism is an attack on reason.”). For example, 
while postmodernist scholar Jean Francois Lyotard defines postmodern as “incredulity towards 
metanarratives,” JEAN FRANCOIS LYOTARD, THE POSTMODERN CONDITION, at xxiv (Geoff Bennington 
& Brian Massumi trans., Univ. of Minn. Press 1984) (1979), Fredric Jameson, a Marxist and 
postmodernist, rejects the view that postmodernist theories are necessarily atomistic and insusceptible of 
generalization. FREDRIC JAMESON, POSTMODERNISM OR, THE CULTURAL LOGIC OF LATE CAPITALISM 3 
(1991) (“[T]heories of the postmodern . . . bear a strong family resemblance to all those more ambitious 
sociological generalizations . . . .”). 
34 Vermont Law Review [Vol. 39:027 
towards metanarratives”—overgeneralizations that try to prove too much.19 
As such, postmodernists have generally resisted Kantianism, Hegelianism, 
and Marxism, all grand theories that take a progressive view of history, that 
knowledge can liberate and that all knowledge has a secret unity.20 This 
skepticism has pervaded several fields of study, establishing lasting 
footholds in fields such as architecture,21 art,22 literature,23 music,24 and 
education.25 In law, postmodernism has spawned the rise of Critical Legal 
Studies, Critical Race Theory, and other “Crits.”26 At bottom, 
postmodernists are skeptical of any claims of objectivity or broad 
generality. 
Jean-Francois Lyotard took particular exception to science, arguing 
that scientists were not really engaged in an objective pursuit of truth, but in 
a self-serving verification of their own research.27 The scientific method, in 
Lyotard’s view, was little more than a quest to confirm the correctness of 
hypotheses, which themselves are products of social structures and biases.28 
But Lyotard’s work is only an extension of the work of another, larger 
postmodernist figure: his contemporary, French philosopher Michel 
Foucault. Foucault’s early defining work, The History of Madness in the 
Classical Age,29 a product of his painstaking research in Parisian mental 
hospitals, is a damning critique of a medical profession that had classified 
homosexuality as a “‘mental illness.’”30 Later, in Discipline and Punish,31 
                                                                                                                 
 19. LYOTARD, supra note 18, at xxiv. 
 20. CHRISTOPHER BUTLER, POSTMODERNISM: A VERY SHORT INTRODUCTION 13 (2002). 
 21. Id. at 89–91. 
 22. Id. at 62–68. 
 23. Id. at 69–73. 
 24. Id. at 73–76. 
 25. PAULINE MARIE ROSENAU, POST-MODERNISM AND THE SOCIAL SCIENCES: INSIGHTS, 
INROADS, AND INTRUSIONS 49 (1992). 
 26. See, e.g., RICHARD DELGADO & JEAN STEFANCIC, CRITICAL RACE THEORY: AN 
INTRODUCTION 5 (Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic, eds., N.Y. Univ. Press 2d ed. 2011) (“[Critical 
Race Theory] also draws from certain European philosophers and theorists, such as Antonio Gramsci, 
Michel Foucault, and Jacques Derrida . . . . From critical legal studies, the group borrowed the idea of 
legal indeterminacy . . . .”). 
 27. See LYOTARD, supra note 18, at 46 (“Scientists, technicians, and instruments are purchased 
not to find truth, but to augment power.”). 
 28. See id. at 4–5 (“Knowledge is and will be produced in order to be sold, it is and will be 
consumed in order to be valorized in a new production: in both cases, the goal is exchange. Knowledge 
ceases to be an end in itself, it loses its ‘use-value.’”). 
 29. MICHEL FOUCAULT, HISTORY OF MADNESS (Jean Khalfa ed., Jonathan Murphy & Jean 
Khalfa trans., Routledge 2006) (1961). 
 30. Gary Gutting, Michel Foucault, THE STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY, 
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2011/entries/Foucault (last modified Sept. 17, 2008). 
 31. MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH (Alan Sheridan trans., Vintage Books 2d ed. 
1995) (1977) [hereinafter FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH]. 
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Foucault more fully developed his argument that science is as much a social 
construction as anything else.32 In a 1975 interview, Foucault said: 
‘[I]f you are not like everybody else, then you are abnormal, if 
you are abnormal, then you are sick. These three categories, not 
being like everybody else, not being normal and being sick are in 
fact very different but have been reduced to the same thing.’33 
What Foucault describes is deference to scientific expertise run wild. 
Cloaked in the guise of scientific objectivity, a medical profession wrote 
definitions and determined courses of treatment, and in effect set its own 
jurisdiction, without any hint of constraint on its authority. This 
classification of persons based on sexual orientation would hold sway over 
the psychiatric profession until 1973.34 
Foucault had a compelling reason for straining against the dominant 
pseudo-science of the time: He was gay.35 It is compelling to consider what 
it must have been like for Foucault to battle the powerful medical 
profession and how that profession demeaned his identity. It is doubly 
compelling to consider how such a categorization was so readily accepted 
in Foucault’s time, given how modern science regards those 
categorizations.36 It is triply compelling to consider that this label of 
“mentally ill” was attached to one of the twentieth century’s most original 
thinkers because of his sexual orientation. 
                                                                                                                 
 32. MICHAEL S. FOLDY, THE TRIALS OF OSCAR WILDE: DEVIANCE, MORALITY, AND LATE 
VICTORIAN SOCIETY 85 (1997); DAVID HALPERIN, ONE HUNDRED YEARS OF HOMOSEXUALITY AND 
OTHER ESSAYS ON GREEK LOVE 16 (1990); see FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH, supra note 31, at 
199 (using social shame surrounding illness as an example). 
 33. Quotes of the Month, MICHEL-FOUCAULT.COM, http://www.michel-foucault.com/quote/
2005q.html (last visited Nov. 19, 2014) (quoting MICHEL FOUCAULT, ENTRETIENS 95 (Roger-Pol Droit 
ed., 2004)).  
 34. The American Psychiatric Association removed “homosexuality” from its list of mental 
disorders in 1973. LGBT-Sexual Orientation, AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, http://www.psychiatry.org/
mental-health/people/lgbt-sexual-orientation (last visited Nov. 19, 2014). The proponent of the removal, 
Robert Spitzer, is considered a luminary in the psychiatry field. Benedict Carey, Psychiatry Giant Sorry 
for Backing Gay Cure,’ N.Y. TIMES (May 18, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/19/health/dr-
robert-l-spitzer-noted-psychiatrist-apologizes-for-study-on-gay-cure.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0. 
Ironically, Spitzer authored a study in 2003 on a treatment that could reverse, or “cure,” homosexuality 
a study for which he recently issued a public apology in the journal which published the original study. 
Robert L. Spitzer, Letter to the Editor, Spitzer Reassesses His 2003 Study of Reparative Therapy of 
Homosexuality, 41 ARCHIVES SEXUAL BEHAV. 757 (2012). 
 35. DAVID M. HALPERIN, SAINT FOUCAULT: TOWARDS A GAY HAGIOGRAPHY 3 (1995). 
 36. See, e.g., Sexual Orientation and Homosexuality, AM. PSYCHOLOGICAL ASS’N, 
http://www.apa.org/topics/lgbt/orientation.aspx (last visited Nov. 19, 2014) (“Since 1975, the American 
Psychological Association has called on psychologists to take the lead in removing the stigma of mental 
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Foucault thus serves as a fulcrum for postmodernism not only because 
of his revolutionary theory but also his personal story. But his skepticism is 
only the beginning of postmodernism. Another strand of postmodernist 
literature seeks to deconstruct language to reveal embedded societal biases 
hidden in word choices and phraseology.37 Jacques Derrida, another 
twentieth century French philosopher, pioneered a school of thought that 
sought to overturn conventional acceptance of key words and phrases as 
descriptors of objective fact. For Derrida and the deconstructionist 
movement, things and situations are susceptible to multiple interpretations, 
and how any given individual interprets a thing or situation is a product of 
that individual’s “enculturation,” or her personal and social history.38 
Postmodernist deconstruction thus posits that meaning is never really 
stable.39 Like Lyotard, Derrida would be skeptical of an interpretation of 
one thing or situation being applied to another. 
As a body of thought, postmodernism has waned in influence, even in 
its most hospitable environment, academia.40 A theory premised upon 
skepticism that there is ever an accurate description of anything is 
especially irritating to researchers in the social, biological, and physical 
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 38. Postmodernists argue that enculturation is a process by which values and privileges are 
made a part of a supposedly neutral process, like education, and by which a Western world view has 
come to be seen as natural and normal. See, e.g., HANDBOOK OF SOCIALIZATION: THEORY AND 
RESEARCH 547 (Joan E. Grusec & Paul D. Hastings eds., 2007) (“[E]nculturation . . . is an 
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values and behaviors by learning what the culture deems to be necessary.”). Derrida’s term 
“Logocentrism” refers to the way society tends to order binaries and then take for granted the 
naturalness of this ranking. Logocentrism is described as “any signifying system governed by the notion 
of the self-presence of meaning; i.e. any system structured by a valorization of speech over writing, 
immediacy over distance.” JACQUES DERRIDA, DISSEMINATION 440 (Barbara Johnson trans., 
Continuum 2004) (1972); see also JACQUES DERRIDA, POSITIONS, at xxiii (Alan Bass trans., Continuum 
2004) (1972) (“‘Logocentrism’ . . . [is] the deep-laid metaphysical prejudice whereby the values of truth 
and reason are equated with a privileged epistemic access to thoughts ‘in the mind’ of those presumed or 
authorized to know.”); DERMOT MORAN, INTRODUCTION TO PHENOMENOLOGY 448 (2000) 
(“Logocentrism refers to the manner in which the traditional prioritisation of reason in philosophy has 
led to everything deemed ‘irrational’ to be swept aside, treated as marginal and insignificant.”). 
 39. Deconstruction is a process or analytical technique used to reveal information that may not 
be obvious or immediately apparent. DECONSTRUCTION IN A NUTSHELL: A CONVERSATION WITH 
JACQUES DERRIDA 31 (John D. Caputo ed., 1997) (“The very meaning and mission of deconstruction is 
to show that things—texts, institutions, traditions, societies, beliefs, and practices of whatever size and 
sort you need—do not have definable meanings and determinable missions, that they are always more 
than any mission would impose, that they exceed the boundaries they currently occupy.”). 
 40. EDWARD SLINGERLAND, WHAT SCIENCE OFFERS THE HUMANITIES: INTEGRATING BODY 
AND CULTURE 96 (2008) (“Bourdieu and the later Latour seem to me to belong to the twilight years of 
postmodernism, a stage where postmodern theorists have become aware of inadequacies in the strong 
postmodernist position but have nowhere else to turn.”); Butler, supra note 20, at 127 (“I believe that the 
period of [postmodernism’s] greatest influence is now over.”). 
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sciences. Research agendas in these types of fields are premised upon some 
widely agreed-upon goalposts, even if subsequent paradigm-shifting 
discoveries wind up moving those goalposts.41 For these fields, such is the 
price of progress: error and failure. Postmodernists do not readily accept 
that cost. Their concern typically lies with those that are disadvantaged by 
change, and it seems a shame to accept such sacrifices for truths that are 
ultimately fleeting. But this fixation on failure is what has cost 
postmodernism a seat at even the widely inclusive academic table: 
Postmodernists have become good at opposing and have lost an ability to 
articulate what they are for. Christopher Butler has written: 
[P]ostmodernists are good critical deconstructors, and terrible 
constructors. They tend to leave that job to those patient liberals 
in their society who are still willing to attempt to sort out at least 
some of those differences between truth and fantasy, which 
postmodernists blur in a whirlwind of pessimistic assumptions 
about the inevitability of class or psychological conflict.42 
Postmodernists never expected to make friends peddling a body of 
thought predicated almost solely upon skepticism. But in an academic 
marketplace of ideas, what most seem to have concluded is that even if the 
reflexive skepticism of postmodernists happen to be proven correct, it does 
not actually do any good to adopt a postmodernist perspective. Not only 
does postmodernism fail to provide any guidance on moving forward, its 
core mission is to cast doubt on the validity of any such guidance.43 
Whereas scientists of all sorts—physical, biological, or social—predicate 
their research on progress, postmodernists remind us of the pitfalls of 
progress. 
II. POSTMODERNIST OBJECTIONS IN ENVIRONMENTAL LAWMAKING 
No one has ever been truly happy with environmental law. Not even in 
its heady early days, when environmental advocates scored important U.S. 
                                                                                                                 
 41. BUTLER, supra note 20, at 17. 
 42. Id. at 116. 
 43. See, e.g., SLINGERLAND, supra note 40, at 143 (“Whether or not it is . . . possible for a 
human being to genuinely embrace an attitude of extreme skepticism, the self-refuting nature of 
skepticism makes it difficult to see . . . how it could function as a viable intellectual position . . . .”); 
BUTLER, supra note 20, at 61 (“For many, the postmodernist position is a disabling one—
postmodernists are just epistemological pluralists, with no firm general position available to 
them . . . .”). 
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Supreme Court victories,44 did environmental advocates believe that they 
could use the law to adequately protect the environment.45 Regulated 
industries, of course, have always complained about costly, burdensome 
regulations and red tape.46 Even in the presence of divided legislatures and 
fractured polities, it would be surprising if no one ever suggested 
improvements to environmental law. 
But environmental postmodernists counsel caution in reforming or 
changing environmental law. Some proposed reforms strike a nerve and 
excite such strong passions that adversaries seem to believe they are 
fighting for the soul of environmental law. This Article focuses on 
opposition to the use of CBA in environmental law and argues that much of 
the opposition to CBA is postmodernist in nature. 
There is an additional development that signals changing times in 
environmental law. In recent years, the role of physical and biological 
sciences in environmental lawmaking seems to have become more 
controversial. Often, the nature of these objections is on the merits: 
Disagreement can arise because of differences of opinion on scientific 
method, interpretation, or techniques. But increasingly, accusations of bias, 
disingenuousness, and conflict of interest are being levied on scientists. The 
objectivity of scientists has been questioned, and evidence of bias may stem 
from their professional position, funding, and incentives to reach a 
particular result in their scientific research. This too is postmodern. Rather 
than engage on the merits of a scientific debate, postmodernists are urging 
lawmakers to draw inferences from circumstantial evidence. Here too 
postmodernism is influential in that it urges us to look beyond the text and 
the putative merits of something proffered and skeptically consider inputs 
into a proposal or process. Importantly, this kind of postmodern attack has 
been as much a mark of regulated industries as it has been of liberal 
environmental groups. 
                                                                                                                 
 44. For example, environmental advocacy groups frequently cite Tennessee Valley Authority v. 
Hill as an example of an upset victory by an environmental interest over a well-funded industrial one 
under the Endangered Species Act. Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 189 (1978); see also Sierra 
Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972) (allowing the then-nascent Sierra Club to stop development of a 
ski resort). 
 45. SAMUEL P. HAYS, A HISTORY OF ENVIRONMENTAL POLITICS SINCE 1945, at 198 (2000) 
[hereinafter HAYS, A HISTORY] (“For others, none of the varied environmental programs worked; they 
were a massive waste of effort and funds.”). 
 46. See, e.g., Thomas O. McGarity, Regulatory Analysis and Regulatory Reform, 65 TEX. L. 
REV. 1243, 1244 (1987) (“Critics argued that federal agencies operated beyond the range of effective 
political control and were irrationally imposing burdensome requirements on regulated entities without 
considering the social costs of the regulations.”). 
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A. The Postmodernist Objection to Cost-Benefit Analysis 
It is no exaggeration to say that quietly and behind the scenes, the 
administrative practice of federal environmental law has changed 
significantly. Proponents and detractors agree that CBA has, in fact, grown 
in importance in federal environmental law- and policy-making.47 To hear 
CBA proponents describe this development, CBA is a welcome tweak and a 
refinement of environmental law- and policy-making.48 To hear critics 
describe it, CBA imminently and gravely threatens the health of humans 
and the environment.49 
CBA in environmental law applies a cost-benefit test to a legal or 
policy change. Public projects are almost always subjected to a CBA to 
determine if the project’s benefits will outweigh the costs, or if the value of 
the outputs will exceed the value of the inputs.50 For federal rulemakings, a 
proposed environmental regulation is subjected to a review by the Office of 
Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA), which is responsible for CBAs 
mandated by executive orders issued by past and current presidents.51 It is 
in this area that CBA generates the most controversy: The suggestion that a 
                                                                                                                 
 47. See, e.g., Shapiro & Schroeder, supra note 16, at 435 (“CBA has only strengthened its 
dominance in the past twenty-five years.”); Richard W. Parker, Grading the Government, 70 U. CHI. L. 
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Benefit Default Principles, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1651, 1656–63 (2001) (describing the shift from the 
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Amy Sinden, The Economics of Endangered Species  Why Less Is More in the Economic Analysis of 
Critical Habitat Designations, 28 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 129, 184 (2004) (“Indeed, formal economic 
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 48. See, e.g., John D. Graham, Saving Lives through Administrative Law and Economics, 157 
U. PA. L. REV. 395 (2008) (arguing that “lifesaving regulation informed by” CBA has advantages over 
regulation informed by alternatives to CBA); see also, RICHARD L. REVESZ & MICHAEL LIVERMORE, 
RETAKING RATIONALITY: HOW COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS CAN BETTER PROTECT THE ENVIRONMENT 
AND OUR HEALTH 3 (2008) (arguing that CBA can improve environmental regulatory decisions). 
 49. Lisa Heinzerling describes a table created by John Morall and used for cost-benefit analysis 
as “a Trojan horse that has been wheeled into the debate over regulatory reform, loaded with the values 
the debate is supposed to be about.” Lisa Heinzerling, Regulatory Costs of Mythic Proportions, 107 
YALE L.J. 1981, 2070 (1998) [hereinafter Heinzerling, Regulatory Costs of Mythic Proportions]. John 
Morall is an economist who worked at the Office of Management and Budget during the 1980s. Id. at 
1983. 
 50. RICHARD O. ZERBE JR. & ALLEN S. BELLAS, A PRIMER FOR BENEFIT-COST ANALYSIS 2 
(2006). 
 51. See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 12866 § 2(b), 58 Fed. Reg. 51735, 51737 (Oct. 4, 1993) 
(describing OIRA’s role in renewing regulations). 
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regulation to protect human health or the environment should pass some 
sort of “test” is viewed as being just an extra obstacle to regulation.52 
At the outset, it is necessary to acknowledge, without resolving, two 
non-postmodernist objections. Daniel Farber and Lisa Heinzerling are 
among those that have argued that applying CBA to certain environmental 
and labor standards violates statutory mandates by which Congress 
delegated authority to the EPA, OSHA, and other regulatory agencies.53 A 
number of statutes mandate standard setting, but then set out some basis or 
criteria that suggest, in Farber’s view, an intent to preclude use of CBA.54 
Phrases such as “requisite to protect the public health”55 or “lowest 
achievable emission rate”56 seem to direct the EPA to take only some 
considerations into account, but not costs.57 These provisions are especially 
noteworthy when juxtaposed against provisions in which Congress did 
seem to contemplate the use of CBA. For example, § 304(b)(4) of the Clean 
Water Act requires the “best conventional pollutant control technology,” 
which includes some consideration of the reasonableness of costs vis-à-vis 
the benefits.58 But while this is an important question—and possibly a 
legally dispositive one—it will not decide the ultimate fate of CBA. 
Congress obviously could, if it were in the mood (and politically able), 
statutorily authorize or even mandate agencies to do CBA. The ultimate 
question is whether it should. 
A second non-postmodernist objection, from Douglas Kysar in his 
book Regulating From Nowhere, is that CBA lacks the moral content 
necessary to guide environmental law- and policy-making.59 CBA rejects 
any normative criteria other than a decidedly rough welfare calculus, which 
is, in Kysar’s view, incongruous with the way that both individuals and 
groups make choices.60 Furthermore, Kysar argues, the embrace of CBA 
would have something of a moral numbing effect that threatens to rob 
                                                                                                                 
 52. See, e.g., Lisa Heinzerling, Risking It All, 57 ALA. L. REV. 103, 113 (2005) (“[A]t OMB 
today, cost-benefit analysis continues to be what it has always been—a one-way street to 
deregulation.”). 
 53. Daniel Farber, Rethinking the Role of Cost-Benefit Analysis, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 1355, 
1356–57 (2009); Lisa Heinzerling, Statutory Interpretation in the Era of OIRA, 33 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 
1097, 1098 (2006). 
 54. Farber, supra note 53, at 1358. 
 55. Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7409(b)(1) (2012). 
 56. Id. § 7412(d). 
 57. Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’n, 531 U.S. 457, 466–68 (2001). 
 58. Best Conventional Pollutant Control Technology; Effluent Limitation Guidelines, 51 Fed. 
Reg. 24974, 24974 (July 9, 1986). 
 59. DOUGLAS A. KYSAR, REGULATING FROM NOWHERE: ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND THE 
SEARCH FOR OBJECTIVITY 13 (2010). 
 60. Id. at 14–15. 
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environmental policy of any moral content whatsoever. Kysar rejects the 
consequentialist approach implicit in CBA in favor of a more traditionally 
deontological view of environmental law. Professor Kysar’s work always 
merits a serious response, but I do not undertake that here. The focus of this 
Article is a certain type of argument that implicitly raises epistemological 
issues more complicated than environmental postmodernists acknowledge. 
Objections by Professors Kysar, Farber, and Heinzerling (at least the ones 
she raises that are described above) raise a number of other issues, but are 
not postmodern. 
The broader normative question is whether CBA offers a better 
decision-making process for environmental law- and policy-making. 
Implicitly, the environmental postmodern objection is that CBA is 
inherently and perhaps purposively biased, so, from a public interest and 
environmental quality perspective, it must be inferior. Environmental 
postmodernists believe that CBA is: (1) more manipulable by regulated 
industries than traditional lawmaking processes; and (2) structurally and 
inherently biased against environmental and public health values. Analyses 
of these two objections now follow. 
1. CBA is Manipulable 
Environmental postmodernists argue that CBA is inherently 
indeterminate. Clashes over environmental regulation are clashes over 
values, which are inherently subjective.61 But CBA purports to transcend a 
value-centered debate and offer an objective alternative, thereby glossing 
over the indeterminacy. Writes Amy Sinden: 
Because it is indeterminate, CBA exacerbates the problem of 
power imbalance. First, it hides the fact of its indeterminacy 
behind a false veil of seemingly accurate, scientific and objective 
numbers, thus masking the value judgments that must inevitably 
go into choosing such numbers.62 
That indeterminacy creates the opportunity for manipulation. Continues 
Sinden: 
[I]ndeterminacy renders CBA not only ineffectual, but also 
endlessly manipulable . . . . [F]or any claim that the benefits of a 
                                                                                                                 
 61. Heinzerling, Regulatory Costs of Mythic Proportions, supra note 49, at 1986. 
 62. Amy Sinden, In Defense of Absolutes  Combating the Politics of Power in Environmental 
Law, 90 IOWA L. REV. 1405, 1454 (2005) [hereinafter Sinden, In Defense of Absolutes]. 
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particular project outweigh its costs, another economist can make 
a credible argument that the costs outweigh the benefits.63 
Rena Steinzor, the president of the Center for Progressive Reform, echoes 
these objections: 
Billed as a non-ideological analytical tool, CBA today is in fact 
the opposite: questionable value judgments masked as technical 
calculations, all used as window-dressing to block rules that 
benefit the public but upset powerful industries.64 
Manipulation need not even be so blunt. CBA can shift not only the terms 
of the debate but also the locus. For some environmental postmodernists, 
CBA is a move to an anti-democratic mode of decision-making, one in 
which public debate is quashed. Mark Sagoff has argued: 
Cost-benefit approaches to public policy . . . substitute 
themselves for the processes of democratic government. The 
genius of cost-benefit analysis is to localize conflict among 
affected individuals and thereby to prevent it from breaking out 
into the public realm . . . . The deeper reason [that industry favors 
cost-benefit analysis] may be that cost-benefit analysis defines a 
framework for conflict that keeps the public qua public and the 
citizen qua citizen out.65 
These accidental environmental postmodernists are telling us that CBA 
is indeterminate, and therefore manipulable, and that powerful industries 
manipulate CBA to consolidate their power. But these accounts have been 
told before by the older, traditional, post-structuralist postmodernists. 
Postmodernists have been arguing that power is exercised through the guise 
of objectivity and neutrality. The postmodern argument is that what people 
perceive as truthful and accurate is really a function of what powerful 
interests assert as being truthful and accurate. In writing about the 
                                                                                                                 
 63. Id. at 1409–10. 
 64. Rena Steinzor, The Unpopularity of Cost-Benefit Analysis, CPRBLOG (Sept. 14, 2012), 
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“‘political economy’ of truth,” Foucault challenges the positivist notion that 
there is one immutable “truth”: 
[T]ruth isn’t outside power . . . . Each society has its régime of 
truth, its ‘general politics’ of truth . . . . ‘[T]ruth’ is centred on the 
form of scientific discourse and the institutions which produce it; 
it is subject to constant economic and political incitement[;] . . . it 
is produced and transmitted under the control . . . of a few great 
political and economic apparatuses . . . .66 
That reform proposals insert themselves into a democratic process 
under a pretense of neutrality, but are really instituted to consolidate power, 
is a fundamental postmodern idea. One of Foucault’s examples was the 
institution of “People’s courts” during the French revolution, introduced (in 
Foucault’s view) not to actually mete out justice, but to partly insulate a 
bourgeoisie from the violent masses67: 
[T]he people’s court . . . did tend to act as a ‘neutral 
institution’ . . . . [It] took up a position as intermediary, 
and . . . functioned as a mediator; in doing this it drew on an 
ideology which was up to a certain point the ideology of the 
dominant class, which determined what . . . was ‘right’ or ‘not 
right’ . . . .68 
Foucault is describing, in his view, the introduction of the People’s 
courts not as actually neutral institutions of “justice,” but as political 
instruments. Foucault was a legal realist!69 This substitution took place 
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1972–1977, at 131–32 (Colin Gordon ed., Colin Gordon et al. trans., 1980) (1972) [hereinafter 
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 68. FOUCAULT, POWER/KNOWLEDGE, supra note 66, at 3. 
 69. In simple terms, legal realism was a counterpoint to formalism, and a reaction against the 
notion that legal rules could serve as a bedrock for legal administration. For a general treatise and 
44 Vermont Law Review [Vol. 39:027 
against a backdrop in which masses were capable of (and indeed did) carry 
out acts of vengeance and revolt that horrified French elites, hence the need 
to calm the masses. 
The postmodern and environmental postmodern narratives do not 
parallel perfectly. Foucault deconstructs a court system, while 
environmental postmodernists deconstruct economics. According to 
Foucault, the French bourgeoisie attempted to appease the violent masses 
by installing a judicial system; however sharp the environmental 
postmodernist criticism, there has not been any threat of decapitation (yet). 
But the dynamic is the same: the introduction of a new institution that poses 
as a neutral arbiter, but in reality is an attempt to seize power. The French 
bourgeoisie can control the outcomes of court decisions, and economists 
can control the outcome of CBAs; there is no real neutrality at all. The 
manipulability of CBA is a rebirth of a postmodernist fear of alien control. 
To environmental postmodernists, the only reason that CBA is proposed is 
to achieve a particular result. Hoping naively that CBA can improve 
environmental lawmaking is like hoping that guardian foxes can overcome 
their taste for chicken. 
2. CBA is Structurally Biased 
On another level, environmental postmodernists go beyond the 
manipulability argument and make the more fundamental argument: Not 
only does CBA give regulated industry a backdoor, but it creates a 
structural bias against the environment. In this account, the affirmative, 
conscious manipulation of CBA is barely necessary. The game is already 
rigged. According to critics, the nature of CBA is such that it tilts the good 
faith practice of CBA against environmental protection.70 Lisa Heinzerling, 
perhaps the strongest critic of CBA, has written: 
The problem is not only that those who start from an 
antienvironmental perspective have often used cost-benefit 
analysis to support their preconceptions. Even when the methods 
are applied in good faith by neutral or environmentally inclined 
investigators, we will see that the results tilt strongly toward 
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endorsement of business as usual, and rejection of health and 
environmental protection.71 
How did that happen? How did a supposedly neutral social science—
economics—become not just a policy tool for regulated industries, but a 
whole new ballgame in which the environment and public health always 
lose? 
The answer offered by environmental postmodernists is that CBA is 
just another falsely objective means of moving environmental discourse 
onto another battleground—economics—in which industrial interests have 
an advantage over environmental advocates. Inherent in CBA is an 
emphasis on monetary values. Compared with environmental values, the 
industrial compliance costs of environmental regulation are clearly more 
measurable, more recognizable, and therefore over-weighted in CBA 
relative to environmental values. The scales are inherently tipped against 
environmental values. Writes Amy Sinden: 
[E]fforts at quantification are inevitably systematically skewed in 
favor of the costs and against the benefits of environmental 
protection. First, because the benefits of regulation are generally 
harder to quantify than the costs, the benefits tend to be 
undercounted. . . . Second, because estimates of the costs of 
regulations are often provided by the industry facing regulation, 
they are often artificially, self-servingly high.72 
Moreover, to do CBAs, one needs economists; economists cost money, 
and industrial interests have money to spend on mercenary economists, 
whereas environmental advocacy groups still scrape up just enough money 
to keep the lights on.73 Thus, the CBA criticism that it requires resources 
that regulated industries have but environmental advocacy groups do not, is 
postmodernist in the sense that it argues CBA is a power grab. 
Beyond these points, environmental postmodernists argue that there is 
a more subtle, but more serious effect. Environmental postmodernists claim 
that CBA introduces an alternative language that conceals indeterminacy 
and falsely projects neutrality and objectivity. Writes Lisa Heinzerling: 
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Most of these people are economists or law professors who have 
a special interest and expertise in economics. Perhaps cost-
benefit analysis is more transparent to these experts because they 
speak its language.74 
This linguistic sleight-of-hand is particularly insidious because, as it 
turns out, people like objectivity and precision. CBA supplies them with 
exactly that, albeit under false pretense. Environmental postmodernists 
assert that clashes over environmental regulation are clashes over values, 
which are inherently subjective.75 CBA purports to transcend a value-
centered debate and offer an objective alternative, thereby offering people a 
way out of the messy business of grappling with value clashes, and 
essentially leaving it up to arbitration by economics. In criticizing an 
influential study in the 1980s by former Office of Management and Budget 
official John Morrall,76 Heinzerling writes: 
Value choices of this kind underlie Morrall’s numbers, as well as 
my own. To say that one of these sets of numbers is true, and the 
other false, is thus misleading. It depends on one’s hopes, fears, 
and anxieties.77 
Later in the article, Heinzerling continues: 
Many thoughtful scholars of the regulatory process have 
embraced the numerical results of Morrall’s table . . . . These 
numbers are beguiling because they promise objectivity and 
clarity. . . . At worst, they derail thoughtful discussion by offering 
the illusion of objective accuracy . . . .78 
What, then, is CBA doing when it conceals the indeterminacy and the 
value choices? It is tacitly choosing a set of assumptions that are not 
necessarily shared by all. Indeed, environmental postmodernists suggest 
that these assumptions are quite narrowly shared only by regulated 
industries. And these assumptions happen to be those that economists tend 
to make, so goes the argument. CBA is the elevation of economics over all 
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other ways of thinking and deciding, and the crowding out—consciously, 
environmental postmodernists would contend—of all others. CBA is thus 
not a neutral policy tool, but a rhetorical barrier that privileges certain 
groups at the expense of others. The language of economics becomes 
power. 
This line of argument is so perfectly postmodern that Foucault, 
Derrida, and Lyotard could not have scripted a better policy problem for 
postmodernist objection. Had they engaged with the dismal science79 they 
probably would have made exactly this argument. As with many things 
postmodern, language plays a central role in exercising power under the 
guise of neutrality. In Power/Knowledge, Foucault sets out his theory on the 
use of language in projecting power. In it, he writes: 
‘Dialectic’ is a way of evading the always open and hazardous 
reality of conflict by reducing it to a Hegelian skeleton, and 
‘semiology’ is a way of avoiding its violent, bloody and lethal 
character by reducing it to the calm Platonic form of language 
and dialogue.80 
What Foucault brought to the fore was the theory that calm and order 
were achieved not by brute physical power, but by language. This use of 
language is central to postmodern theory. Postmodernist feminist scholar 
Judith Butler has argued that power is exercised through falsely neutral 
language. In Excitable Speech, she writes: 
Power works through dissimulation: it comes to appear as 
something other than itself, indeed, it comes to appear as a 
name.81  
Language creates norms, and norms are the hidden way in which power is 
covertly exercised. In The Psychic Life of Power Butler writes: 
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The psychic operation of the norm offers a more insidious route 
for regulatory power than explicit coercion, one whose success 
allows its tacit operation within the social.82 
Although traditional postmodernist theorists never seemed to target 
economics, the core notion that language is really indeterminate and 
therefore a fundamental instrument of power is exactly what CBA critics 
argue. Economics as a discipline does not overtly privilege itself over other 
social sciences, but does generally hew closely to a set of core modeling 
principles, such as rationality and maximization assumptions.83 As such, it 
incorporates quantitative preferences that are somewhat antithetical to 
qualitative preferences in social sciences, such as sociology and 
anthropology.84 Although most economists have made peace with 
psychology, economics remains a field that is intellectually insular.85 And if 
economists refuse to engage seriously with at least some social scientists, it 
opens them up to claims that they “privilege” their own work over that of 
others. Whether or not this is a fair characterization, it would sound familiar 
to Jean-Francois Lyotard, who wrote: 
Scientific knowledge requires that one language game, 
denotation, be retained and all others excluded. . . . Scientific 
knowledge is in this way set apart from the language games that 
combine to form the social bond.86 
Similarly, in Two Lectures, Michel Foucault wrote: 
[B]y subjugated knowledges one should understand something 
else, . . . namely, a whole set of knowledges that have been 
disqualified as inadequate to their task or insufficiently 
elaborated: naive knowledges, located low down on the 
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2014] The Accidental Postmodernists 49 
 
hierarchy, beneath the required level of cognition or 
scientificity.87 
The attack on CBA is really postmodernism reborn. Environmental 
postmodernists have attacked CBA and its proponents in the same way that 
Foucault attacked the psychiatric profession and Lyotard attacked the 
sciences. No critic has tried to equate the two or suggest CBA is anything 
like homophobia. In fact, environmental postmodernists do not appear to 
see themselves as postmodernists at all. But in both cases, there arose a 
profession—psychiatry in Foucault’s early days and economics today—that 
offered a new direction in thinking and a new set of definitions. In both 
cases, there is at least the perception that the profession is exclusive and 
that members share a language that is alien to almost all outsiders. In both 
cases, there is fear of a hidden agenda. And in both cases, there is some 
apparent danger that the profession is allowed to largely regulate itself. 
Thus, according to critics, not only is CBA re-creating the mistakes of the 
past that have been wrought on unfortunate groups (including, but not 
limited to, gays and lesbians), but CBA represents dangerous, permanent 
and fundamental shifts in power, disenfranchising not just aggrieved 
populations, but everybody outside the conquering profession. 
The critique that CBA is a structural shift is the most fundamental 
objection to CBA. If, as critics charge, it is impossible to make CBA 
accessible or to make it more neutral in its application, and impossible to 
refine it so that it takes better account of non-market environmental goods, 
then there is no point in trying. The prescription would be to abandon CBA 
altogether. At the same time, this structural argument makes the other 
arguments irrelevant. Making CBA more accessible by translating results 
into plain language is pointless because under a postmodernist critique, 
such an effort would inevitably cloak or even reinforce the inherent bias. 
Efforts by OIRA to make CBA more transparent are pointless and perhaps 
even perpetuate the illusion of neutrality. In the strongest form of 
environmental postmodernism, there is no legitimate role for CBA in 
environmental law- and policy-making. 
3. Do the Environmental Postmodernists Have a Point About CBA? 
One need not be an environmental postmodernist to accept that CBA 
has been manipulated, or even that fixing CBA faces some fairly daunting 
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epistemological challenges. Examples abound.88 In many cases, the 
environmental postmodernists would appear to have a point. 
Not only that, but rifts within the economic profession seem to show 
that some economists really do behave in ways that postmodernists predict. 
Some economists try to create differentiations of reputation among 
economists in attempting (in their view) to safeguard the credibility of 
economics. One of the most prominent and perhaps the most important 
internecine battles pertains to a disagreement over the last decade over the 
economic cost of greenhouse gas emissions. The “social cost of carbon,” 
the harm avoided from reducing greenhouse gas emissions, is the figure 
representing the benefit side of a CBA for policies to address climate 
change. Yale economist William Nordhaus, one of the first economists to 
even consider the costs of climate change, sparred sharply with British 
economist Nicholas Stern, the author of the Stern Review on the Economics 
of Climate Change.89 Stern’s opinion that the social cost of carbon was 
about $85 per ton of CO290 contrasted with Nordhaus’s estimates, which 
ranged from about $2.50 per ton91 to an updated estimate of $7.40 per ton.92 
A number of differences in assumptions underlie the vast difference in 
estimates, but the one that most accounts for the difference is Stern’s use of 
an unusually low discount rate and Nordhaus’s use of a higher, more 
traditional one.93 Uncertainty about future conditions uncontroversially 
justifies some discounting of future costs and benefits, but how much? 
Despite the entreaties of Nordhaus and others that choice of discount rate is 
a purely economic matter and that Stern was out of bounds for assuming 
such a low discount rate,94 most economists seem to have accepted that, at 
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least for climate change, there is no universally correct discount rate and 
that discounting over such long-time horizons necessarily involves the 
incorporation of some social values. Most economists would view Stern’s 
discount rate to be as valid as Nordhaus’s.95 
The dispute gets interesting because Nordhaus has not just been critical 
of Stern, but has questioned his motivations and his sophistication. 
Nordhaus wrote in a critique published in the Journal of Economic 
Perspectives, that the Stern Review is essentially “political in nature and has 
advocacy as its purpose.”96 Fellow economists Gary Yohe and Richard S.J. 
Tol wrote that the Stern Review “subjected academic standards to political 
goals.”97 Tol even remarked to a BBC reporter: 
If a student of mine were to hand in [the Stern Review] as a 
Masters thesis, perhaps if I were in a good mood I would give 
him a ‘D’ for diligence; but more likely I would give him an ‘F’ 
for fail.98 
Another tenet of economics is that it strives to be just descriptive, 
rather than prescriptive.99 Nordhaus believes that his work is descriptive, 
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while Stern’s is prescriptive and conflates economic analysis with lower 
forms of knowledge, akin to “ethical ideals”: 
Analyses are sometimes divided between the “descriptive 
approach,” in which assumed discount rates should conform to 
actual political and economic decisions and prices, and the 
“prescriptive approach,” where discount rates should conform to 
an ethical ideal, sometimes taken to be very low or even 
zero. . . . The Stern Review takes the prescriptive approach in the 
extreme . . . .100 
Putting aside the implausibility of a professor issuing a failing grade to 
a project such as the Stern Review, this is fodder for postmodernists because 
the level of vitriol suggests a level of excitement not often seen among 
practitioners of the dismal science. What are Nordhaus, Yohe, Tol, and 
others so excited about? They are concerned not only about methods and 
practice, but a stark and threatening divergence from a fundamental 
economic practice. If discount rates can be varied as widely as Stern’s 
review suggests, then CBAs can be anything, and if CBAs can be anything, 
then the currency of economics is at risk. The response of Nordhaus and 
other economists is to rush to defend a practice of economics. Nordhaus’s 
dismissal of the Stern Review as “political advocacy,” and Tol’s mock 
grade of the Stern Review are not only attempts to separate themselves from 
Stern, but to degrade Stern’s standing in the economic profession. 
As Sheila Jasanoff chronicles in her prescient book, The Fifth 
Branch,101 a profession will do “‘boundary work’” to restrict entry into the 
profession, thereby limiting those with privilege to invoke the authority of 
the profession.102 Economists racing to castigate Stern are concerned in the 
first instance with the prestige and exclusiveness of the economics 
profession and its privileged voice in public policy. Castigating Stern’s 
work as “ethical,” “political,” “prescriptive,” worthy of a grade of “D” or 
“F” is an attempt to police the boundaries of economics, and an attempt to 
place Stern on the outside, in the interests of maintaining the authorities of 
those inside. Perhaps the likes of Nordhaus and Tol simply suffered from 
moments of ill temper, but there is enough recurrence on their parts to 
suggest otherwise. Perhaps they are policing the boundaries they perceive 
                                                                                                                 
of wealth and income, economists generally recognized the limits of their role in providing normative 
prescriptions for social change or legal reform.”). 
 100. William Nordhaus, Critical Assumptions in the Stern Review on Climate Change, 317 
SCIENCE 201, 202 (2007). 
 101. SHEILA JASANOFF, THE FIFTH BRANCH: SCIENCE ADVISORS AS POLICYMAKERS 14 (1990). 
 102. Id. 
2014] The Accidental Postmodernists 53 
 
to define sound economics. That is exactly what Foucault would have 
predicted. 
But environmental postmodernists claim too much when they 
extrapolate this kind of behavior into the grander claim that there is a 
conspiracy at work. Ignoring the many internal tensions inside economics, 
they mistakenly cast the economic profession as a monolith with a clearly 
defined, anti-regulatory objective in mind. Some postmodernists may be 
surprised to learn how many economists would agree with the contention 
that economics is flawed with respect to its application to environmental 
problems. Good economists would concede that much gets lost in the 
simplifying assumptions that are made in the course of a CBA.103 And good 
economists would also concede that, even as they try their best to avoid 
using economic jargon themselves, economics does in fact involve a 
different set of terms.104 
Another important divergence between the Stern camp and the 
Nordhaus camp, one that gives credence to postmodernists who claim a 
structural bias in CBA, is their disagreement over the valuation of 
nonmarket impacts. Part of what made Stern’s estimates higher than 
Nordhaus’s105 is Stern’s attempt to incorporate some hard-to-value non-
market impacts from climate change, such as the loss of biological diversity 
and impacts on human health.106 Without denying the importance of these 
impacts, Nordhaus finds these impacts speculative.107 Adherents of this 
view would omit non-market environmental and ecological impacts as 
better than taking a good-faith, but poorly executed, attempt to quantify 
them. There is something arbitrary, under that view, of making a bad 
attempt at quantification, that smacks of making something up. 
Were that the prevailing view, then of course the environmental 
postmodernists would be correct in arguing there is a systemic bias against 
environmental and ecological values in CBA, at least with respect to 
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climate change. But that is not the prevailing view. Staying within a 
traditional neoclassical economic tradition, Harvard economist Martin 
Weitzman has written one the most influential papers of all, warning of the 
limitations of CBA due to the “thick-tailed” statistical distribution of 
damage probabilities.108 Swedish environmental economist Thomas Sterner 
has written about the need to account for the possibility that environmental 
goods could be so scarce in a climate-changed world that traditional CBAs 
would systemically underprice environmental damages.109 Most revealing is 
that while Nordhaus’s writings remain influential, his estimates of the 
social cost of carbon are clearly on the low side of an economic literature 
that has become quite crowded with estimates of the costs of climate 
change.110 
It is perhaps puzzling that postmodernism has taken such a long time to 
mount an attack on economics, and that it has come in the form of 
apparently unwitting, accidental postmodernists. The older, French 
postmodernism closer to Foucault clearly attacked the sciences. While 
economists consider themselves social scientists, with an empirical tradition 
similar to the physical, biological, and medical sciences,111 they have 
clearly not achieved the universality, concrete falsifiability, and 
experimental verification methods achieved by their more respectable, 
cross-campus colleagues.112 Moreover, economists have stubbornly 
maintained a habit of being intellectually insular and have guarded their 
boundaries vigorously. And although economists profess neutrality, it is at 
least superficially plausible that economics has been used to justify 
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increasing gaps in power, wealth, and justice113—typically a central concern 
to postmodernists.114 So one would think that economics would long have 
been a tempting target for postmodernist disgruntlement. Instead, 
postmodernists seem to have avoided economics altogether.  
In a widely cited review of postmodernism and the social sciences, 
postmodern scholar Pauline Marie Rosenau addresses postmodern 
engagement with history, geography, women’s studies, public 
administration, sociology, anthropology, political science, and 
psychology115—but not economics. It has instead fallen to several 
environmental law professors to marshal an epistemological attack on 
economics. Environmental postmodernists, in seizing on a reform 
movement revolving around CBA, have grasped that the economic 
profession is an ascendant threat to public policymaking. Whether 
economics improves public policy or not, it does seem poised to 
intellectually displace other approaches, including that of environmental 
lawyers. 
Environmental postmodernists have a weapon that they do not appear 
to have utilized yet: evolutionary psychology. Jonathan Haidt, in his 
acclaimed book The Righteous Mind, argues that people do not naturally 
employ reason to reach a conclusion, but they overwhelmingly tend to have 
an emotive reaction and subsequently come up with a rationalization to 
support it.116 Haidt has on his side the evolutionary biology giant, Edward 
O. Wilson, who predicted in the 1970s that science would come around to 
recognizing that evolution not only shaped physiology but also human 
behavior. What has indeed come to pass is a body of neurological and 
psychological research centering upon the parts of the human brain that 
process emotional reactions.117 Researchers now know that certain reactions 
having to do with what people consider moral issues activate these 
emotional centers of the brain. Different cultures generate different 
moralities, of course, but the cognitive sequence, Haidt concludes, is 
remarkably similar across a variety of cultures: Intuitions come first, 
reasoning follows behind.118 Furthermore, persuading others requires an 
appeal not to the reasoning faculties of others, but to their intuitions. 
Remarkably rarely does human reasoning feedback change some sort of a 
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judgment about a disputable fact.119 Why do people do this? The 
evolutionary psychological story is that reasoning faculties have developed 
to serve human purposes that are not necessarily related to what we would 
consider “truth.” They have emerged, for example, so people can obtain 
power.120 Postmodernists are more correct than they ever bothered to realize 
when they argue that most objective-seeming presentations are really just a 
patina for a power play. 
If this is true, then it becomes perfectly plausible that CBA is a post-
hoc rationalization to justify anti-regulatory biases. Professor Farber’s 
observations of how partisan former OIRA directors have really been 
ideologues121 feed perfectly into an evolutionary psychological story of how 
the morality of industrial development has driven the emergence of a new 
rationalization strategy called CBA. 
But this account—that CBA is just a coordinated power grab—is 
implausible. For one thing, there are signs that regulated interests are 
beginning to sour on CBA, as more and more CBA analyses begin to show 
the benefits of regulation, such as in the area of climate policy.122 
Moreover, in order for this account to be true, all the work spent on refining 
and debating CBA would have to be explained away as mere show. The 
degree of domestic squabbling makes this implausible. Revesz and 
Livermore, while arguing for greater utilization of CBA, acknowledge its 
failures and propose several reforms in their book.123 Along the way, they 
pointedly note that under the directorship of John Graham, CBAs at OIRA 
only counted unanticipated increases in risks from regulation, but not 
unanticipated decreases in risks from regulation.124 This one-sidedness is 
not only revealing, it also introduces potentially huge error. For example, 
reductions in sulfur dioxide achieved huge unanticipated benefits, not from 
the expected reductions in acid rain, but from the health benefits of reduced 
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fine particulate matter,125 which were not quantified at the time of 
regulation and not considered until relatively recently.126  
The volume of work dedicated to refining CBA is also hard to explain 
as part of a conspiracy. Daniel Cole proposes the convening of a National 
Academy of Sciences panel to develop a set of best practices that should be 
expected of any CBA issued in support of or against a proposed 
regulation.127 In my other work, I build upon Professor Cole’s idea by 
proposing the institution of “citizen prompt letters,” which would enable 
individuals to issue calls for regulation on the basis of CBAs conforming to 
a well-established set of best practices.128 Matthew Adler has taken on the 
distributional critiques and proposed weighting measures in CBA to assign 
the welfare of poorer households a greater influence over the outcome of 
CBAs,129 a proposal that has yet to provoke any reaction from 
environmental postmodernists. 
The environmental postmodernist challenge to CBA and its economic 
underpinnings has thus served a function, though not one that the 
environmental postmodernists had in mind. If the goal of environmental 
postmodernism was to rid the world of CBA, they have thus far failed. 
Instead, in their urgency to exterminate CBA, environmental 
postmodernists have helped bring about a healthier debate about the 
practice and role of CBA. Foucault would have been disappointed. 
B. The Postmodernist Challenge to Science in Environmental Lawmaking 
Traditional, post-structuralist postmodernist theorists have historically 
had deep suspicions of the hard sciences, owing in part perhaps to 
Foucault’s run-ins with the psychiatric and medical professions. But what 
Foucault only implied about scientific inquiry, Jean-Francois Lyotard 
charged much more bluntly. For Lyotard, developments in science in the 
mid- to late-twentieth century portended not a new enlightenment, but 
                                                                                                                 
 125. Richard Schmalensee & Robert N. Stavins, The SO2 Allowance Trading System  The 
Ironic History of a Grand Policy Experiment, J. ECON. PERSP. (forthcoming) (manuscript at 5), 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2124037. 
 126. See, e.g., Francine Laden et al., Reduction in Fine Particulate Air Pollution and Mortality  
Extended Follow-up of the Harvard Six Cities Study, 173 AM. J. RESPIRATORY & CRITICAL CARE MED. 
667 (2006) (extending mortality follow-up from previous studies to 1998 to examine changes in fine 
particulate air pollution). 
 127. Daniel Cole, Best Practice’ Standards for Regulatory Benefit-Cost Analysis, 23 RES. LAW 
& ECON.: J. POL’Y 1, 3 (2007). 
 128. Shi-Ling Hsu, The Identifiability Bias in Environmental Law, 35 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 433, 
497–99 (2008). 
 129. MATTHEW D. ADLER, WELL-BEING AND FAIR DISTRIBUTION 137–45 (2012). 
58 Vermont Law Review [Vol. 39:027 
simply a shift from one power-grabbing discourse to another.130 To 
Lyotard, scientists were just part of another special interest group on the 
take; science was just another false objectivity created as a lever of 
power.131 
Environmental postmodernists might not go quite so far. It is not so 
much that environmental postmodernists would do away with science 
altogether (as they might with economics). No one would argue that a rule 
to regulate a pesticide or chemical should be driven solely by personal 
values, devoid of any scientific input. But environmental postmodernists 
have sounded the alarm over the pseudo-science that has hijacked the 
environmental rule-making process. In that sense, there is a great deal of 
ideological science in the public realm, and we are cautioned to not believe 
everything we hear that bears the label “science,” or “sound science.” 
Science, like economics, is infected by powerful industrial interests. Lisa 
Heinzerling, in reviewing the book Bending Science,132 writes: 
Science—the discipline so many of us trust to come clean with 
us, to treat us squarely—has not escaped the contagion. Indeed, 
in Bending Science, Professors Thomas McGarity and Wendy 
Wagner detail just how thoroughly and insidiously the scientific 
process can be—and repeatedly has been—“bent” to produce 
results consistent with economic or ideological motives.133 
Thomas McGarity and Wendy Wagner’s book Bending Science 
chronicles the ways in which science has been misrepresented in court, and 
by legislatures and regulatory agencies, to suit a narrow private agenda and 
thwart a broader public interest.134 Significantly, McGarity and Wagner find 
not only well-resourced regulated industries engaging in such shenanigans, 
but also plaintiffs’ lawyers handling personal injury cases.135 But while 
plaintiffs’ lawyers extract undeserved judgments and settlements, by far the 
bigger problem is the widespread harm imposed by regulated industries 
producing chemicals and pharmaceutical products consumed by or exposed 
to an oblivious general public. Postmodern or not, it is a disquieting read. 
Environmental postmodernists are very often right to sound the alarm. The 
point of this Article is not to debunk environmental postmodernism, but to 
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observe how we go about settling the difficult epistemological issues that 
inevitably arise in complex environmental problems. McGarity and Wagner 
are accidental postmodernists because they pose concerns with the authority 
of science as it is presented in the regulatory context. 
But that begs the question of exactly how lawmaking can effectively 
incorporate science, given the failures thus far. Unsurprisingly, some of the 
proposed solutions suggested by McGarity and Wagner require lawyers. 
But some of their proposals are aimed at greater transparency. 
Transparency measures deserve more attention, as it is hard to see why 
anyone, even a postmodernist, would object to greater transparency. 
While environmental postmodernists opposing CBA have almost 
exclusively been environmental advocates and lawyers, those agitating over 
the role of science in public policy have been more diverse. Significantly, a 
group of people skeptical of the urgency of climate change (commonly 
labeled as “climate skeptics”) have complained bitterly about how the 
science of climate change has been hijacked by climate scientists and used 
to promote an agenda of environmental extremism. I consider much of this 
movement environmentally postmodern. Consistent with postmodernist 
tendencies, climate skeptics have argued that a hidden agenda is at work: 
Not only does a left-wing faction wish to promote a climate agenda, but 
also one of environmental radicalism with a hidden agenda. Climate change 
is just a Trojan horse by which radical environmentalists hope to achieve a 
broader political victory.136 
At bottom, both economics and science are inaccessible to most 
laypersons, including lawyers. Knowledge is power, and when an 
information asymmetry exists, one can expect it to be exploited for private 
gain. CBA is inaccessible to non-economists, and the postmodern view is 
that certain economists exploit this esoteric knowledge for a narrow private 
gain. Science can also be inaccessible, even among peer scientists—this is 
the complaint of environmental postmodernists. If conducted 
unscrupulously and opaquely, a broader scientific community can be as 
disenfranchised as laypersons. The environmental postmodern objection is 
thus concerned with the power imbalance that is generated by an 
information imbalance. Even among experts, a scientific metanarrative can 
run amok. 
This section sets out what environmental postmodernism has to say 
about science in the regulatory context. It draws heavily upon and critically 
analyzes Wagner’s earlier work on toxic risk regulation, The Science 
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Charade in Toxic Risk Regulation,137 and other seminal works examining 
the role of science in public policy, including Sheila Jasanoff’s Fifth 
Branch. 
1. Funding Science to Bend It 
One of the more troubling problems reported by McGarity and Wagner 
involves the potential for funding considerations to influence the outcome 
of scientific studies or, worse still, to completely drive the direction and 
outcome of entire programs of scientific research.138 Their compilation of 
stories of manipulation paints a grim picture of the role of science in the 
public lawmaking process: how private firms attacked the integrity and 
competence of scientists presenting inconvenient health and environmental 
research; how they otherwise managed to hide inconvenient research; how 
they used public relations strategies to “spin” research; and how they used 
their resource advantage to create entire research agendas friendly to their 
industrial interests.139 Their work in turn builds upon work by Sheila 
Jasanoff, who first critically examined the ways in which science was used 
as an input into public lawmaking processes.140 
Empirical research unambiguously shows that industry-sponsored 
research is more likely to produce results favorable to the sponsoring 
industry than independently funded research.141 This is intuitive and 
unsurprising. But the problem identified by environmental postmodernists 
is much wider and more profound. Sponsorship of individual research 
projects is too clumsily overt. So regulated industries set up shop 
completely outside of the traditional academy of research and recruit 
scientists by offering better pay.142 Pharmaceutical companies, for example, 
can avoid the scrutiny and disclosure requirements imposed by universities 
and medical schools by contracting directly with medical researchers.143 On 
the trend towards sponsored research more generally, McGarity and 
Wagner write: 
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Taking full advantage of the opportunity that sponsored research 
offers to call the piper’s tune, manufacturers occasionally pool 
their resources in “research centers” that are structured to fund a 
number of individual research projects. The centers typically 
resemble government research agencies or private foundations, 
and they often employ the traditional model of soliciting and 
approving research proposals from interested researchers in 
academia or the private sector.144 
With these sponsored research enterprises bearing a resemblance to 
non-profit, non-partisan, and philanthropic research organizations, it 
becomes difficult for the consuming public and lawmakers to discern the 
objectivity and legitimacy of science. As McGarity and Wagner point out, it 
does not matter if this science is so manipulated that it ceases to be science; 
what matters is that policymakers and the general public are unable to 
discern the difference.145 
A world and a generation away, post-structuralist postmodernists have 
long been lamenting that funding pressures have always driven science. 
Even Rene Descartes ran into funding problems.146 And the more general 
concern with the subtler influences of money was first articulated by 
Lyotard before being chronicled by McGarity, Wagner, and Jasanoff: 
Capitalism solves the scientific problem of research funding in its 
own way: directly by financing research departments in private 
companies, in which demands for performativity and 
recommercialization orient research first and foremost toward 
technological “applications”; and indirectly by creating private, 
state, or mixed-sector research foundations that grant program 
subsidies to university departments, research laboratories, and 
independent research groups with no expectation of an immediate 
return on the results of the work . . . .147 
That money talks is hardly news, and the collision of influence 
peddling with the ascendance of science as an input into public lawmaking 
has perhaps been inevitable for a long time. Postmodernists do not have a 
monopoly on this worry. But the environmental postmodern objection is 
more developed than simply “the fix is in.” The environmental postmodern 
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objection highlights structural factors that would elude the simpler rent-
seeking accounts.148 It is the relationship between power and false 
objectivity that is the hallmark of postmodern agitation. Financial 
influences and public choice theory may explain the reason for rent-
seeking, but postmodernism can explain the more interesting mechanism by 
which it is accomplished. 
2. Science Wielding Power 
The postmodern account is about power masquerading as authority. 
The authority can be the promise of neutrality. The authority of science, 
however, derives from its promise of knowledge of a greater universality. 
Gravitational forces are the same no matter where on earth they are tested; 
aspirin works on people of all races, cultures, and ages. The replicability of 
scientific “facts” is what makes scientific predictions reliable and useful for 
public lawmaking. Answers about the harmfulness of a toxic chemical need 
to be correct and need to be applicable to a wide range of humans or other 
life forms. 
For a postmodernist, the esoteric nature of scientific knowledge creates 
a power imbalance. The power imbalance derives from the implicit 
authority of scientists to define their own domain. Fortunately for scientists, 
the vast majority of the world is ill-equipped to challenge scientists on their 
claims.149 But in order for the knowledge imbalance to translate into a 
power imbalance, scientists must establish that their knowledge is better 
than other forms of knowledge. If an environmental activist expresses a fear 
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that a certain pesticide will cause him harm, a scientific response must 
resort to something more universal than fear. Scientists will, in the 
postmodern account, helpfully remind us that they have a better, more 
universal, and more reliable form of knowledge: 
The scientist questions the validity of narrative statements and 
concludes that they are never subject to argumentation or proof. 
He classifies them as belonging to a different mentality: savage, 
primitive, underdeveloped, backward, alienated, composed of 
opinions, customs, authority, prejudice, ignorance, ideology. 
Narratives are fables, myths, legends, fit only for women and 
children. At best, attempts are made to throw some rays of light 
into this obscurantism, to civilize, educate, develop.150 
Polemics aside, this is a consistent theme in French postmodernism. As 
noted in Part II.A.2 above, French postmodernists are clearly fixated on a 
perceived condescension from certain professional groups.151 But this 
condescension has a purpose: The higher platform must be defended from 
intruders. Maintaining authority requires policing the boundaries of what is 
“science” and what is not. As discussed above, Sheila Jasanoff explores the 
role of “boundary work,” in which scientists define the boundaries of their 
expertise, and more significantly, their membership, which enjoys exclusive 
license to practice under the authority of their subfields of science.152 This 
boundary drawing is fundamental because only by limiting entry into a 
group can the group preserve its credibility, maintain sufficient opaqueness 
to preserve its authority, and maintain the ability to control the output of its 
members. Central to the concern with the capture of science raised by 
environmental postmodernists are the function of scientific communities as 
their own gatekeepers and the willingness of modern societies to allow 
them a fair amount of autonomy in policing their own ranks. Left to 
effective self-regulation,153 scientific communities can create and maintain 
authority simply by restricting entry into their ranks. 
While the postmodern attack on science tends to be not so much on the 
professional scientists themselves but on the way that they have fallen prey 
to outside influences, the environmental postmodern complaint clearly 
identifies the existence of a subset of scientists that have been allowed to 
wield power under the banner of their scientific subfields. These renegade 
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scientists may not constitute a majority in their scientific subfields, but they 
are likely to wield outsized influence over the science that is deployed in a 
public lawmaking process. McGarity and Wagner focus on applied research 
that is narrowly directed toward specific applied questions of policy 
relevance—what they call “policy-relevant science”154 and what Jasanoff 
calls “regulatory science.”155 The reason that special interest groups are able 
to capture policy-relevant science is because it tends not to be the kind of 
cutting-edge science for which scientists are rewarded with recognition 
within the academy. So the best researchers do not tend to gravitate towards 
policy-relevant science.156 At the same time, special interest groups are 
intensely interested in policy-relevant science, and are willing to expend 
significant resources to develop it and to “bend” it to suit their private 
ends.157 So “the boring work of pesticide toxicity testing” is left to those 
who will do science for pay.158 Scientific communities thus become cleaved 
into policy-relevant science and everything else, and it is this former sub-
realm of science that becomes the instrument of special interest groups. 
How do policy-relevant scientists wield power? Like other closed 
shops, they do boundary work, restrict their membership, and control their 
messaging to maintain authority in the public lawmaking process. Despite 
the fact that those performing policy-relevant science are nominally 
members of a larger and more legitimate scientific community, the low 
academic stakes of policy-relevant science drives out potential dissenters. 
Top researchers who are truly independent shy away from peer review of 
policy-relevant research, as not only is it of low academic interest, but it is 
vigorously policed by interested parties. A negative review can be expected 
to be met by venomous attacks that injure the reputation of the researcher. 
The regular practice of attacking creates an ex ante disincentive to wade 
into a question over policy-relevant science.159 The incentives are thus 
designed to drive out dissenters and maintain a tightly knit scientific sub-
community with a narrow special purpose. In this and other ways, policy-
relevant scientists carefully control their messaging. 
Discrediting scientists who dare to interfere with the science-
messaging mission is child’s play for an organized group. Simply spinning 
and labeling are important strategies for sowing doubt about certain 
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research and certain people.160 The label “junk science” has been used to 
devastating effect, while appeals to “sound science” are applied to advance 
favored results.161 The postmodernist insight is that this is about drawing 
boundaries and implicitly creating a power differential: Those who do 
“sound science” are scientists, and those who peddle “junk science” are not. 
Scientists have authority; junk scientists do not.162 
The peer review process, intended to protect the integrity of science, 
can be similarly employed. The idea of peer review is that scientific 
research is only published after objective, disinterested, and expert 
reviewers give it a stamp of approval, certifying the quality and accuracy of 
the research findings.163 But, as a postmodernist would confidently predict, 
like other mechanisms portrayed as objective and neutral, peer review 
becomes an instrument of power. The peer review process still requires the 
selection of reviewers, and the selection of friendly reviewers is always a 
strong possibility in the small intimate community of researchers.164 
Moreover, the lower public attention, shorter timelines and limited 
resources for the review of policy-relevant science all point to the 
susceptibility of the peer review process to be used as a tool.165 Rather than 
the neutral gatekeeper that it was meant to be, peer review is, as 
environmental postmodernists submit, a way for a cadre of policy-relevant 
scientists to build and maintain “cognitive authority,” and to defend it from 
dissenters.166 
Perhaps most significantly for postmodernists, the peer review process 
is a mechanism for boundary line drawing. In fact, the primary function of 
peer review is to police the boundary between quality science and “junk 
science.” The peer review process is one in which editorial decisions can 
subtly or obviously influence outcomes.167 In the policy-relevant world 
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then, it would surprise no one that peer review is sometimes used to do the 
bidding for special interest groups seeking to discredit research.168 
The collective scientific illiteracy of the general populace169 invites a 
power grab. Even for those that spend significant chunks of their 
professional life following the science of climate change, the problem still 
boils down to, as one science sociologist put it, “picking the experts you 
think you can trust.”170 In fact, even lawmakers and administrators have 
found it necessary to allow scientists to self-govern. In such a situation, it is 
perhaps inevitable that policy-relevant scientists should wield power in a 
fashion predicted by postmodernists. 
3. Science as a Social Construct 
What makes science so indeterminate in a regulatory system so 
devoted to insuring its reliability?171 Bending with funding is possible 
because of a pervasive and unfortunate myth that science can be firewalled 
from the influences of politics and special interest groups seeking favorable 
regulatory policy. This myth, argue the environmental postmodernists, 
induces rational agencies, industrial interests, and even non-profit 
environmental organizations to seek to capture the exalted mantle of 
science to wield over the policy world.172 Were we to dispense with the 
myth that science somehow offers the objectivity needed to arbitrate policy 
disputes, then we could see science for what it is: just another social 
construct (goes the postmodern argument). 
Wagner argues in her earlier work that when lawmakers mandate 
scientific input into lawmaking decisions, the nature of the input is really 
“trans-scientific”—inherently a blend of science and policy. Science in the 
public policy process is thus at least partially a social construct and 
representations of science as objective and free of influence are 
misleading.173 Similarly, Jasanoff writes that “[w]e have become aware of 
the socially constructed nature of scientific reality and of the intermingling 
of facts and values in disputes arising at the frontiers of science.”174 Sidney 
Shapiro and Christopher Schroeder describe the rise of a “post-empiricist” 
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movement, which questions whether science generates an objective 
description of reality.175 The idea that science is somehow above the fray is 
thus a “myth.”176 
In fact, the traditional post-structuralist postmodernists posit exactly 
that. The French postmodernist tradition would tell us that it is a charade to 
separate the possession of specialized knowledge and the exercise of power. 
As Lyotard wrote: 
[K]nowledge and power are simply two sides of the same 
question: who decides what knowledge is, and who knows what 
needs to be decided?177 
According to the postmodern account, if science is of epistemic value but is 
not freely available, then somebody has to decide when something is or is 
not “science.” This is French postmodernism packaged for the 
administrative state that relies on policy-relevant science. The account is 
strikingly similar to the claims made by Jasanoff, who wrote: 
[S]cientific “facts” are, for the most part, socially constructed. 
We regard a particular factual claim as true not because it 
accurately reflects what is out there in nature, but because it has 
been certified as true by those who are considered competent to 
pass upon the truth and falsity of that kind of claim.178 
Thomas Kuhn’s The Structure of Scientific Revolutions179 provides a 
seminal account of how and when wide bodies of scientific knowledge give 
way to new theories and scientific “facts.” Kuhn describes how beliefs by a 
critical mass of scientists can abruptly shift from one body of theory to 
another—giving rise to the popularized phrase “paradigm-shifting”—and 
change a field of science virtually overnight. It is this unnerving historically 
recurrent pattern that undermines claims that science presents bedrock 
knowledge. 
Nor does the peer review process deliver the objectivity that lawmakers 
and the public have, perhaps unrealistically, come to expect from it. The 
inherent social construction of science renders the peer review process 
nearly impossible to scrub clean of bias. It is not so much the fraud, bias, 
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sexism, institutional bias, and outright incompetence in peer review that are 
troubling;180 it is the reality that the process and the outcomes of peer 
review are inextricably intertwined with social objectives.181 
Environmental and post-structuralist postmodernists thus share 
skepticism of the deference bestowed upon scientists. The environmental 
postmodern account is more sophisticated than that offered up by post-
structuralists, who have embarrassed themselves by revealing some 
fundamental misunderstandings of scientific concepts.182 But environmental 
postmodernists have (unconsciously) followed the lead of their post-
structuralist forerunners in attempting to deconstruct scientific claims and 
blur the boundaries that scientists have worked hard to establish and 
maintain. 
C. Environmental Postmodernism from Climate Skeptics 
Recalling the origins of postmodernism—Foucault’s struggles with 
powerful and prestigious medical and psychiatric professions—serves to 
underscore postmodernism’s origins in anti-establishment, counter-trend 
tendencies.183 This has struck a chord in an environmental movement that 
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has also traditionally been suspicious of consolidated power.184 But at the 
risk of sounding postmodernist, what is “the establishment”? 
From the political right comes a new environmental postmodernism: a 
challenge to what has become a mainstream establishment of climate 
scientists. While a vast majority of scientific researchers have coalesced 
around a belief that climate change represents a very serious risk, an 
agitating minority of climate skeptics claim that the mainstream science is 
wrong, manipulated, and a power play to seize the reins of power by 
invoking the emergency of climate change.185 
Why should we be surprised? Environmental postmodernists have 
argued that science has always been a social construct, and if it is a social 
construct incapable of stable, objective meaning, then it is susceptible of 
hijacking. This climate skeptic postmodernism comes not only from a 
small, but vocal group of climate researchers, but also skeptical laypersons 
unafraid to weigh in on matters in which they have an expertise 
disadvantage. Climate postmodernists have attempted to counter their 
expertise disadvantage the same way that postmodernists and 
environmental postmodernists have in the past: They have tried to change 
the subject. When confronted with authority, postmodernists will always 
question authority’s objectivity, thereby challenging its legitimacy. It does 
not hurt that climate postmodernists enjoy financial backing from the Koch 
brothers,186 the fourth-richest individuals in the United States.187 
It seems safe to say that most climate skeptics would be even less 
inclined than environmental postmodernists to identify with the anti-
establishment, liberal political positions heretofore associated with 
postmodernism. But a cadre of scientists do see themselves as an oppressed 
minority in their policy world of interested climate change researchers. 
Non-scientific climate skeptics have taken up their grievance in earnest. 
Throughout their calls to question or reject the prevailing climate science, 
climate skeptics rail against the larger, better-funded, mainstream 
community of climate scientists who call for policy action to arrest climate 
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change. The climate skeptic community has done so in ways and with 
rhetoric that sounds surprisingly like the environmental postmodernists who 
oppose CBA and harbor doubts about the soundness of policy-relevant 
science, and generally have the opposite set of worries of climate skeptics 
and the Koch brothers. 
1. Funding Climate Science to Bend It 
A common complaint levied by climate skeptics is that mainstream 
climate scientists have rigged the federal grant-making process to direct 
research funds only to like-minded researchers. According to climate 
skeptics, climate science has become dogmatic, so that what is considered 
credible enough for research funds is defined by what the mainstream 
climate scientists themselves define as being “credible.” The awarding of 
research funds inherently requires some gatekeeping, lest scarce federal 
research dollars be wasted. Climate skeptics assert that this gatekeeping 
function has been captured. 
Importantly, climate skeptics do not necessarily claim that it is 
ideology per se that motivates mainstream climate scientists. According to 
climate skeptics, it is power, and the concomitant flow of money, that is 
supposedly sought. By trumpeting the dire risks of climate change, climate 
scientists are, in the climate skeptic story, alarming politicians and the 
general public into devoting more dollars to climate research.188 
Roy Spencer, an atmospheric sciences professor at the University of 
Alabama at Huntsville and a climate researcher and skeptic, writes in his 
blog Global Warming: 
But what DOES exist is a large organization that has a virtual 
monopoly on global warming research in the U.S., and that has a 
vested interest in AGW [anthropogenic global warming] theory 
being true: the U.S. Government. The idea that government-
funded climate research is unbiased is laughable. The push for 
ever increasing levels of government regulation and legislation, 
the desire of government managers to grow their programs, the 
dependence of congressional funding of a problem on the 
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existence of a “problem” to begin with, and the U.N.’s desire to 
find reasons to move toward global governance, all lead to 
inherent bias in climate research.189 
This climate skeptic complaint is that a problem has been concocted so 
climate scientists can, with the assistance of funding, undertake a massive 
taxpayer-funded research effort under the guise of rescuing us from our 
folly. Climate scientists are not any more immune from funding problems 
than Descartes, about which Lyotard remarked: “[n]o money, no proof—
and that means no verification of statements and no truth.”190 This is the 
same complaint from climate skeptic Richard Lindzen, who writes: 
Even in the 19th Century, most scientists needed institutional 
homes, and today science almost inevitably requires outside 
funding. In some fields, including climate, the government has 
essentially a monopoly on such funding.191 
Under the postmodern complaint propounded by climate skeptics then, 
climate science is just another device for obtaining funding. This would not 
be possible without the creation of some source of authority, which climate 
scientists have created with their esoteric (but sprawling) research into the 
science of climate change. 
2. Climate Scientists Wielding Power 
As noted above, environmental postmodernists have argued that 
scientists draw boundaries. Scientists doing policy-relevant research draw 
boundaries to legitimize their own science and to discredit science reaching 
contrary conclusions, and they are not shy about using the peer review 
process for those purposes. This complaint is almost perfectly mirrored by 
climate skeptics: their most consistent complaint is that mainstream climate 
scientists have ruthlessly drawn boundaries and excluded dissenters. Patrick 
Michaels, a climate skeptic, has argued: 
The result of all this is that our refereed literature has been 
inestimably damaged, and reputations have been trashed. Mr. 
Wigley repeatedly tells news reporters not to listen to “skeptics” 
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(or even nonskeptics like me), because they didn’t publish 
enough in the peer-reviewed literature—even as he and his 
friends sought to make it difficult or impossible to do so.192 
Richard Lindzen has written: 
Although there are many reasons why some scientists might want 
to bring their field into the public square, the cases described here 
appear, instead, to be cases in which those with political agendas 
found it useful to employ science. This immediately involves a 
distortion of science at a very basic level: namely, science 
becomes a source of authority rather than a mode of inquiry. The 
real utility of science stems from the latter; the political utility 
stems from the former.193 
This passage could have been written by Lyotard himself, so perfect is the 
parallelism between Lyotard’s skepticism and Lindzen’s cynicism. At the 
core of both complaints is the underlying premise that there is no inherent 
utility to the scientific endeavor, only the seeking of artificially-created 
rents. 
Ross McKitrick, a Canadian economist who has devoted a large part of 
his scholarly output to casting doubt on climate change, has also remarked 
on what he perceives as the dual practices of censoring by peer review and 
intimidation by editorial fiat: 
In the end, the paper was accepted for publication, but not in a 
climatology journal. Fortunately for me, I am an economist, not a 
climatologist, and my career doesn’t depend on getting published 
in climatology journals. If I were a young climatologist, I would 
have learned that my career prospects would be much better if I 
never wrote papers that question the IPCC. The skewing of the 
literature (and careers) can only be bad for society, which 
depends on scientists and the scientific literature for trustworthy 
advice for wise policy decisions.194 
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No institution has been the target of more accusations than the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). Formed by the United 
Nations to periodically assemble hundreds of the most active and prominent 
climate researchers in the world, the IPCC produces a report every few 
years that reviews and synthesizes the literature on the science and policy of 
climate change.195 A gatekeeping function is thus implicit in the IPCC’s 
function. Synthesizing literature implicitly requires judgment, which 
requires accepting some research and rejecting other research. 
Consistent with a postmodern view, the IPCC is thus very much a 
social and political body. Although scientific judgments should form the 
bedrock criteria for developing a literature review, some subjectivity must 
unavoidably creep in. To preserve its authority, the IPCC has strived to 
create the appearance of objectivity. It has included climate skeptics in its 
worldwide body of climate scientists that prepare its periodical reports, 
including Richard Lindzen, one of the most vituperative critics of climate 
science.196 Despite these efforts, climate skeptics remain highly critical of 
the IPCC. John Christy, a colleague of Roy Spencer at the University of 
Alabama at Huntsville and another dissenting climate scientist, has written: 
Selected lead authors have the last word in the review cycle and 
so control the message, often ignoring or marginalizing 
dissenting comments. ‘Consensus’ and manufactured-confidence 
ensued.197 
Spencer himself has echoed that complaint: 
[The IPCC] is primarily a political advocacy group that cloaks 
itself in the aura of scientific respectability while it cherry-picks 
the science that best supports its desired policy outcomes, and 
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marginalizes or ignores science that might contradict the party 
line.198 
In 2011, the United States House of Representatives voted to deny 
funding to the IPCC for preparation of its climate reports.199 We should not 
be surprised that criticism of the IPCC rises monotonically with its 
influence. And we should not be surprised that attempts by the IPCC to 
answer criticism are Sisyphean: The harder it tries to appear objective, the 
greater its authority, and hence the greater the postmodern objection. It is 
no doubt true that the IPCC indirectly, but palpably, influences funding 
decisions. The ingredients for a postmodern objection are present: authority 
based on the pretense of objectivity in science, boundary-drawing, and raw 
bullying. Are these not the ingredients of postmodernism? 
One might engage in a thought experiment of imagining a legion of 
French researchers investigating the nature of sexual preferences in the 
1940s and 1950s. What would their reception in the French academy look 
like? Would their articles be marginalized in the way that climate skeptics 
say theirs have been marginalized? The merits of the objection are beside 
the point. Regardless of the merits of climate science and climate 
skepticism, I argue in this Article that there is a power relationship and a 
power dynamic that would look very familiar to a postmodernist. 
3. Climate Science as a Social Construct 
Perhaps most fundamentally, a strain of climate skepticism has reached 
into a more philosophical realm to express doubt about the innate 
knowability of climate science. Just as Sheila Jasanoff has argued that 
science is a social construction,200 climate skeptics have argued that climate 
science is inherently a social construction, and only illusory in its stated 
transcendence of petty politics and lesser forms of knowledge. Some 
climate skeptics have very consciously raised postmodernist objections in 
urging skepticism towards climate science. David Demeritt, a geography 
professor, has even invoked postmodernists, such as Baudrillard, in 
attempting to strip climate science of its authority: 
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Impressed by science’s spectacular capacity to represent, 
simulate, and construct nature through such practices as 
computer modeling and genetic engineering, some social 
constructionists, following Baudrillard (1983), have posited the 
total eclipse of the real and the natural by the virtual and artificial 
within a new, hyper-real society of the simulacra . . . . By 
unmasking the heterogeneous and contingent social relations 
involved in the practice of science, this form of social 
construction is directed against “certain pictures of reality, truth, 
discovery, and necessity” and the scientistic “ideology 
of . . . pious reverence” for science these metaphysics produce.201 
The most fundamental argument that climate skeptics make is the deepest 
one: Climate science is subject to an innate unknowability—a known 
unknown, to borrow from the former Defense Secretary202—such that 
attempts to make the science more objective are inherently doomed to fail: 
In all of human history, what was believed and promoted by the 
majority of service intellectuals (high priests) in each civilization 
was only created and maintained to support the hierarchy and the 
place of the high priests within the hierarchy. To believe that the 
present is any different regarding any issue managed by our 
“experts”, whether in medicine, psychology, cosmology, 
economics, law and governance, population health or ecology, is 
pure distilled idiocy.203 
Also reminiscent of postmodernist objection is climate skeptics’ 
warning that this power-grab is not just about the funding itself, or an 
attempt to capture a limited research budget. An element of the climate 
skeptic argument is that climate change is a veiled attempt to impose a 
broader menu of environmental restrictions that would not have been 
politically palatable otherwise. Climate skeptics have often called climate 
change a “Trojan horse” in which a broader “socialist” agenda is to be 
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smuggled into a freedom-loving society.204 It is reminiscent of Lisa 
Heinzerling’s argument that the Trojan horse of CBA is the vehicle in 
which a political deregulatory agenda is being smuggled into the debate 
about environmental protection.205 
Climate skeptics, generally propounding an agenda of low energy 
prices and pro-business governmental policy, are odd bedfellows indeed 
with not only French, structural postmodernists, but also the more modern 
and sophisticated environmental postmodernists. But recall Lyotard’s 
description of postmodernism: “as incredulity towards metanarratives.”206 
Suspicion, the most reliable characteristic of postmodernists, provides the 
link between the environmental postmodernists and their Koch-funded 
adversaries on the other side of the environmental divide. 
III. THE POSTMODERNIST CONDITION IN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 
Environmental issues are uniquely frustrating from an epistemological 
point of view. Uncertainty is ubiquitous. Environmental issues are uniquely 
indeterminate because so many scientific questions are deeply intertwined 
with social and ethical issues, further complicating decision making and 
planning. Even on the single dimension of uncertainty, environmental 
problems run a particularly large spectrum. Climate change takes up a 
position at the far end of that spectrum. 
Pervasive scientific uncertainty, combined with the entanglement of 
social and ethical issues, produce confusion and discord, and create 
conditions for the emergence of the kinds of people and organizations that 
the post-structuralist postmodernists warned us about: information 
entrepreneurs satisfying a public craving for authority by projecting 
expertise and objectivity. The esoteric nature of environmental issues 
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exacerbates this postmodernist dynamic by creating vast differences among 
individuals in their sophistication and their ability to evaluate the veracity 
of environmental information. Where information asymmetries exist, 
people with more information have power, and power will find money, or 
better yet, more power. The stakes of environmental conflict can be 
enormous—trillions of dollars in the case of climate change207—so that 
private interests have strong incentives to deploy skillful information 
entrepreneurs. 
But where does that leave us? If the thrust of environmental 
postmodernism is to reject the economically-motivated reform efforts and 
to cast a skeptical eye towards policy-relevant science, then what is the way 
forward? Can environmental postmodernists suggest an alternative? 
A. The Postmodernist Problem with Environmental Postmodernism 
It would be unfair to say that environmental postmodernists have never 
proposed any alternatives to skepticism, a critique that has been devastating 
to post-structuralist postmodernism. The problem is that environmental 
postmodernists have done exactly what they accuse their nemeses of doing: 
trying to grab power. That this occurs unwittingly is perhaps the cleverest 
contribution of postmodernism. 
Amy Sinden has argued for a framework based on power imbalances to 
inform environmental law- and policy-making. Her article In Defense of 
Absolutes208 draws on Ronald Dworkin’s work on “trumps” as the basis for 
arguing for the use of absolute environmental rights to counter a 
fundamental political power imbalance.209 Analogizing from constitutional 
rights that trump other policy priorities, Sinden uses the seemingly 
inflexible mandates of the Endangered Species Act (ESA) to illustrate what 
she means by absolute rights.210 The ESA also provides examples of large 
political power imbalances, and Sinden argues that this is an application of 
her principle of empowering a historically weak interest: the 
environment.211 Similarly, in Climate Change and Human Rights,212 
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Professor Sinden laments a power imbalance that on her account, 
contributes to potentially disastrous inaction on climate change. Sinden’s 
prescription is for a discourse more centered upon human rights than 
economic efficiency.213 Sinden’s analogy between the harms to human 
civilizations large and small, with other, better-recognized violations of 
basic human dignities, finds some support in the existence of two actual 
cases involving harms from climate change.214 
Lisa Heinzerling argues that debates over environmental issues are 
obscured by the use of CBA and the indulgence of economic analyses.215 
Recall that her objection to CBA and like economic analyses is the false 
objectivity insinuated by dollars and cents.216 But her prescription is to keep 
environmental discourse focused on “values,” lest it be waylaid by the siren 
song of numerical precision and objectivity.217 
But the same criticisms made by Sinden and Heinzerling can be 
leveled at their own proposals. Without acknowledging the epistemological 
tradeoffs, Sinden, Heinzerling, and environmental postmodernists argue for 
a deontological approach, and argue that it will produce better outcomes. 
Without becoming mired in the endless debate over whether society is truly 
better off by focusing on certain environmental outcomes or numerical 
indices, the more interesting question is this: Are the environmental 
postmodernists doing anything different from the economists they criticize? 
Consider Sinden’s proposal to vest environmental interests with 
“absolute” rights under the ESA. I do not quarrel with Sinden on the 
importance of the ESA. Nor do I quarrel with her thesis that predictable 
political failures warrant strong provisions, such as those in the ESA 
(although substantial literature shows how absolute provisions in the ESA 
are administratively evaded218). But how is such a thesis to be made into 
generally applicable policy, or even a guiding principle for environmental 
law? What rights ought to qualify as “absolute”? Taking just one of the 
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more obvious problems with an absolutist approach, what happens when 
there are environmental interests on both sides of a question? In light of the 
seriousness of climate change, should renewable energy sources be 
privileged in violating the ESA and other wildlife statutes?219 
These are dauntingly complex questions. Is it an accident that making 
these kinds of determinations is intractable in a way that would inevitably 
draw in environmental lawyers? Who would be equipped to weigh in on 
determinations of what is “absolute,” an “environmental interest,” or a 
“human right”? An argument that appears to have self-preservation as its 
purpose need not be conscious rent-seeking; specialized professional 
training in a particular field or way of thinking inevitably imbues the 
professional with a heightened appreciation of her field and a relative lack 
of appreciation for alternative ways of thinking. But if economics is 
indeterminate and incoherent, what is one to do with the human rights focus 
that environmental postmodernists have given us? 
The point of this exercise is not to expose environmental postmodern 
approaches as folly. There is much to agree with them. The point is to bring 
to the fore assumptions underlying the environmental postmodernist 
arguments and illustrate how they fail to grapple with the fundamental 
epistemological differences between reformers and environmental 
postmodernists. Environmental postmodernists are offering a different kind 
of information and a different way of knowing. But it is as presumptuous to 
privilege the postmodernists’ way of knowing as it is to make CBA a 
privileged science. Environmental postmodernists argue that CBA has 
become privileged and seek to dislodge it from its mantle. But they seek to 
replace it with an approach which is equally indeterminate and, 
coincidentally, one in which they have the unique skills to drive decision 
making. 
At bottom, the flaw with environmental postmodernists’ objection to 
CBA is, in a sense, hypocritical: It implicitly presumes a discourse that is, 
in their view, superior to CBA. That is the very objection that 
environmental postmodernists levy against economists and CBA. Settling 
this disagreement cannot be accomplished by resorting to logic. That would 
privilege logic over CBA and other approaches. Environmental 
postmodernists do not offer a principled way to determine whether CBA 
does a better job of promoting environmental protection, or even economic 
efficiency, than their proffered alternatives. 
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B. The Relativity of Wrong 
Postmodernism has also historically stumbled by failing to distinguish 
from among levels of correctness or incorrectness. For postmodernists, it 
seems, if truth cannot be absolute, then it can be nothing except a means for 
a power grab.220 But even casual consumers of science can appreciate that 
some physical laws can be more right than others. Science fiction writer 
Isaac Asimov once wrote of this “relativity of wrong[ness]”: 
[W]hen people thought the Earth was flat, they were wrong. 
When people thought the Earth was spherical, they were wrong. 
But if you think that thinking the Earth is spherical is just as 
wrong as thinking the Earth is flat, then your view is wronger 
than both of them put together.221 
The nature of progress in physical, life, and social sciences is such that 
we tolerate imperfect states of knowledge as necessary in order to have 
progress. Moving the goalposts is thus part of the game, as any research, 
discourse, and progress must take place in a context where there is a 
conventional truth worth challenging and, eventually, rejecting. The nature 
of progress is the accumulation of these rejected theories that narrow the 
inquiry to increasingly more likely or more powerful explanations.222 
Where postmodernists have fallen down is in their insistence that 
everything with a grain of untruth be swept into the bloated category of 
“wrong.” 
This postmodernist slippery slope intolerance is most marked among 
climate skeptics. For some in this community, climate science is just too 
arbitrary and constructed to be considered “science.”223 Fundamentally, it is 
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difficult to dispose of the uncontroversial fact that the Earth as a system is 
retaining more solar energy.224 Even with near-unanimity among climate 
scientists that climate change poses present and future risks ranging from 
damaging to catastrophic change,225 climate skeptics insist that climate 
science is just plain garbage.226 This is the rebirth of the postmodernist 
proclivity to point to a few imprecisions as reason to doubt the knowability 
of anything. 
C. Environmental Postmodernism Reformed? 
Even if postmodernism fails to provide guidance for solving 
environmental problems, it flags a disturbing tendency. Uncertainty and 
discord create difficult and complex decisions, and the resulting temptation 
is to avoid a straight-on political resolution by seeking out an umpire. The 
intractability of environmental problems cries out for some way of 
refereeing our deep-seated differences. But postmodernist or not, there is 
something troublingly convenient about delegating a difficult and important 
decision to others—economists or scientists, or a process or institution that 
claims expertise or objectivity, or both. It is as if exasperation with our 
inability to settle disagreements creates a vacuum of authority that, at least 
under the postmodernist account, invites abuse of power. 
If postmodernism is to be useful at all, its essential skepticism must be 
harnessed so that its logical endpoint is something other than an utterly 
helpless nihilism. Is there ever an alternative to just accepting that some 
disagreements can never be settled? Most postmodernists would probably 
say yes, but then be confounded by their reflexive skepticism toward any 
affirmative proposal on the grounds that it is a hidden power grab.227 
Postmodernism has clashed with physics, psychology, biology, legal 
positivism, climate science, and a wide variety of other metanarratives. 
Indeed, any singular substantive approach must have a theory, a theory 
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requires a metanarrative and a discipline, and a discipline requires esoteric 
knowledge; along with esoteric knowledge comes power. Could 
postmodernists ever be for anything? 
There is at least one class of policy measures that postmodernists could 
in principle support, and environmental postmodernism may provide a clue. 
Some environmental postmodernists have proposed measures to increase 
the transparency of environmental decision making.228 Measures to broaden 
process inputs and increase transparency are the only kinds of affirmative 
measures that a postmodernist could ever coherently favor. The 
fundamental postmodern complaint is, after all, about the sly consolidation 
of power. If a measure could only broaden access to information, then it 
would tend to be power dissipating, rather than power consolidating. In 
fact, taking post-structuralist postmodernism to its logical conclusion—that 
there is no singular, correct, universal truth—the only permissible way of 
deciding anything is to maximize the amount of public participation and 
make publicly available all of the information available about a decision. 
Transparency makes things like crowdsourcing possible, and this kind of 
referendum by public access to information is the only possible way 
forward for a postmodernist. 
Along those lines, environmental postmodernists have put forward 
suggestions. Lisa Heinzerling, as one of three editors of a volume of essays, 
Reforming Regulatory Impact Analysis,229 endorsed a number of 
recommended changes to CBA practice in regulatory impact analyses, 
including: analysis of meaningful alternatives;230 adherence to a “checklist” 
of good practices;231 comprehensibility to lay audiences, including the 
adoption of “plain English” standards;232 a statement of consequences of 
agency actions;233 equal application of CBA to deregulation as well as 
regulation decisions;234 and consideration of distributional consequences.235 
This is Heinzerling in her less postmodernist mode, consorting with a body 
of economists very closely tied to CBAs—the widely respected think tank 
Resources for the Future. This is also environmental postmodernism 
tapping into one of the environmental movement’s best policy ideas: 
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opening up government decision making to public scrutiny.236 The National 
Environmental Policy Act,237 which ushered in a worldwide wave of 
environmental assessment legislation,238 requires nothing substantive, but 
does require an environmental impact statement that sets out the 
environmental consequences of a federal decision.239 Public participation 
has always been a hallmark of the environmental movement.240 
McGarity and Wagner suggest some ways to improve legal 
engagement with science. For example, they propose a mandatory conflict 
disclosure for scientific information or critiques that are submitted to courts 
and regulators.241 Such disclosures would detail the influence that sponsors 
had on the study.242 Conflict of interest disclosures have become 
commonplace in a growing number of contexts,243 so it does not seem 
unreasonable or overly burdensome to require them whenever scientific 
information has the potential to influence regulators or courts. McGarity 
and Wagner also propose data-sharing requirements for scientific research 
that serve as an input to policy-making or court decisions, even when they 
are privately funded.244 Since the universality of science is based in large 
part on its replicability, requiring data access would not be particularly 
intrusive. In CBA, there is clearly room for improvement. Environmental 
postmodernists would do well to push for them, particularly those oriented 
towards greater transparency, such as plain English requirements. 
Climate change excites strong emotions, and hearing out climate 
skeptics that have carried out scurrilous attacks might be painful. Judith 
Curry is an atmospheric scientist whose work on hurricanes and climate 
change245 is respected by mainstream climate scientists, and who is also 
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praised by climate skeptics for her willingness to engage with their 
skepticism.246 Curry concedes that among climate skeptics there is “a lot of 
crankology out there.”247 But scattered amongst the vast detritus of climate 
crankology are nuggets of legitimate suggestions. Economist and climate 
skeptic Ross McKitrick has written a paper suggesting a carbon tax that is 
indexed to the global mean temperature.248 If the global mean temperature 
rises, then the carbon tax would go up, the idea being that nature is the 
“referee” of the climate debate.249 The IPCC (of which Curry is quite 
critical250) has been the target of much criticism, but also suggested 
reforms. Some have suggested embedding certain non-scientists into the 
IPCC evaluation process, including journalists,251 mathematicians, 
statisticians, and others.252 McKitrick has suggested IPCC reforms that 
smack of environmental postmodernism: create a more open process for 
selecting lead authors253 (who necessarily wield a considerable amount of 
editorial power), diversify the range of disciplines so that more than just 
climate scientists are involved,254 and create a more transparent contributing 
author process.255 By themselves, it is hard to see why these reforms would 
be controversial. 
The postmodern condition in environmental law is rooted in 
skepticism. In some part, increasingly partisan politics plays a role in the 
disintegration of trust in environmental policy. If postmodernism is to have 
a function, it is to challenge the universality of metanarratives. The role of 
environmental postmodernism is to challenge the universality of asserted 
premises that are influencing the development of environmental law. But 
                                                                                                                 
(Sept. 16, 2005); Judith A. Curry et al., Mixing Politics and Science in Testing the Hypothesis that 
Greenhouse Warming is Causing a Global Increase in Hurricane Intensity, 87 BULL. AM. 
METEOROLOGICAL SOC’Y 1025, 1032 (2006). 
 246. Michael D. Lemonick, Climate Heretic  Judith Curry Turns on Her Colleagues, SCI. AM., 
Nov. 2010, available at http://www.scientificamerican.com/article.cfm?id=climate-heretic. 
 247. Id. 
 248. Ross McKitrick, A Simple State-Contingent Pricing Rule for Complex Intertemporal 
Externalities, 33 ENERGY ECON. 111, 118–19 (2011). This idea has served as the inspiration for my own 
work on the idea of prediction markets for climate outcomes. See Shi-Ling Hsu, A Prediction Market for 
Climate Outcomes, 83 U. COLO. L. REV. 179 (2011). 
 249. John Tierney, Trusting Nature as the Climate Referee, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 14, 2009), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/15/science/15tier.html. 
 250. Lemonick, supra note 244. 
 251. See David Adam & Suzanne Goldberg, How to Reform the IPCC, THE GUARDIAN (Feb. 
10, 2010), available at http://environmentalresearchweb.org/cws/article/opinion/41760.  
 252. See ROSS MCKITRICK, GLOBAL WARMING POLICY FOUND., WHAT IS WRONG WITH THE 
IPCC? PROPOSALS FOR A RADICAL REFORM 39 (2011) [hereinafter MCKITRICK, IPCC]. 
 253. Id. at 4. 
 254. Id. at 39. 
 255. Id. at 38. 
2014] The Accidental Postmodernists 85 
 
rather than just agitating, the best way forward for environmental 
postmodernists is to focus agitation on the one thing that should be non-
controversial: the reasonable expansion of process and the increased 
transparency of decision making. 
Lest we forget, today’s postmodernism, if successful, can be the target 
of tomorrow’s postmodernist attacks. Postmodernists, of course, have their 
ideologies; it would be naïve to believe that postmodernists are process-
obsessed saints. Among the proposals by McGarity and Wagner to open up 
policy-relevant science are proposals aimed at the deregulatory ideology 
they are more afraid of. They propose, for example, that people who lodge 
misconduct charges against scientists should be required to disclose 
“financial or ideological” interests in the outcome of challenged 
research.256 Using almost exactly the same words, McKitrick proposes that 
IPCC lead authors be required to disclose their “intellectual conflicts of 
interest,” meaning their connections to “environmental activist 
organizations.”257 It is not clear if any of the environmental postmodernists 
actually see that their own proposals might lash back upon the scientists 
that they support. 
CONCLUSION 
Environmental law is an area of public policy with ideal conditions for 
postmodern objection. Uncertainties inherent in environmental issues 
incubate disagreement. Environmental issues also excite emotions 
stemming from bitterly competing worldviews of the role of industrial 
wealth-generation.258 Given the messy, value-laden disagreements that 
seem to confront antagonists in every environmental conflict, there is a 
natural temptation to seek out a referee. Referees may hold esoteric 
information about the environmental issues, and this produces an 
information asymmetry that produces power. 
Postmodernists have seized on this dynamic before but have stumbled. 
Three principal problems have plagued traditional, twentieth-century, 
French post-structuralists: They have failed to appreciate the relativity of 
wrongness; they have failed to comprehend the nature of scientific inquiry; 
and they have generally failed to articulate a positive vision to accompany 
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their reflexive skepticism. For these reasons, postmodernism has probably 
run its course as a coherent body of thought. 
And yet, postmodernism did not arise out of nowhere, and 
environmental postmodernism has clearly caught hold of some serious 
problems with environmental law- and policy-making. Problems with CBA 
cry out for greater scrutiny and the use of science in the policy-making 
process must be better informed, more nuanced, and above all, more 
skeptical. And although, in this author’s view, the vast majority of climate 
scientists are justified in their conduct of climate science and in their policy 
prescriptions, there is something unsatisfying about the typical explanation 
of why the general public has not joined climate scientists in their alarm. It 
is just too pat to say that climate skepticism is solely the result of merchants 
of doubt259 and the Koch brothers. Climate skeptics are exploiting a fear, an 
anxiety, or a discomfort that climate scientists and climate policy advocates 
have insufficiently addressed. All of these phenomena are metanarratives 
that require something beyond top-down communication. For any policy 
issue with large-scale consequences, and for anything that looks like a 
metanarrative purporting to handily address the issue, some skepticism is 
warranted. For policy advocates, a plausible ground game is needed to 
reach a broader constituency than just a group of policy cognoscenti, to 
avoid even the appearance of a power grab. 
Environmental postmodernists have suffered some of the same pitfalls 
that have befallen their French, post-structuralist forerunners. They have 
sometimes failed to appreciate that there is a relativity of wrongness and 
that progress depends on incremental discoveries that do not necessarily 
deliver certainty. While there have been leaps in knowledge and widespread 
acceptance, there are no eternal bedrocks of truth, not even in “hard” 
sciences, such as physics. Newtonian mechanics gave way to Einstein’s 
general theory of relativity,260 which is itself recognized to be 
incomplete.261 But the nature of scientific inquiry is such that advances are 
not permanent truths, but new reference points for discussion. The 
environmental postmodernist’s mistake is to confuse criticism with 
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refutation. Climate skeptics have lost their tolerance for the back-and-forth 
that has defined scientific progress for centuries, insisting instead that 
climate science achieve a level of certainty that is impossible, especially for 
such a complex undertaking. And when environmental postmodernists raise 
objections to CBA, they sometimes fail to appreciate that CBA doesn’t 
present a “right” answer, but a new reference point for discussion. The 
relevant question is whether one approach adds epistemological value or 
not. For both CBA critics and climate skeptics, a demand for greater 
precision should be accompanied by a comparison with a proffered 
alternative, and a demonstration as to why it is a superior approach. 
To their credit, environmental postmodernists have sometimes done 
exactly that. But a trap awaits. When making an affirmative proposal, 
environmental postmodernists must avoid committing the same sin for 
which they criticize reformers: trying to steer the terms of debate onto their 
own turf. This is the case, for example, when CBA is criticized on the 
grounds that economists don’t know how to resolve environmental 
conflicts, but lawyers do. Responding to a power grab with a power grab-
back is not progress. 
For a postmodernist, the only principled way forward is to broaden 
public participation and knowledge. Virtually any substantive proposal will 
confer power upon some group and will therefore be open to postmodern 
objection. In such a world, neither economists nor lawyers should get to 
decide; the only legitimate arbiter is the court of public opinion. What 
remains is procedural reform that increases public access to the information 
inputs to environmental decision making. It is possible to craft procedural 
proposals that are so clearly aimed at expanding process and increasing 
transparency, and so clearly power-diffusing that only the most crabbed 
postmodernist would see it as a power grab. In an era of increasing internet 
access, transparency measures become attainable. Serendipitously, this 
procedural tack is reminiscent of one of environmentalism’s greatest 
contributions: the introduction of environmental assessment statutes, which 
have (at least in the United States) imposed minimal substantive obligations 
but significant procedural obligations.262 
Skepticism is warranted when economists arrive at the doorstep and 
announce, “we’re from the Economics Department, and we’re here to 
help.”263 But if there is something the academy has learned from its 
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flirtation with postmodernism, it is that skepticism has to be accompanied 
by something affirmative. What a brief encounter with environmental 
postmodernism has illustrated is one form of that affirmative way forward: 
procedural reform. If done with an open mind, it is a way out of the 
nihilistic dystopia that has always been associated with postmodernism. 
                                                                                                                 
here-help-schoolyard-edition (describing unintended consequences of government programs against 
bullying); Geoffrey Norman, We’re From the Government, and We’re Here to Help you Lose Weight, 
WEEKLY STANDARD (June 26, 2012, 9:15 AM), http://www.weeklystandard.com/blogs/were-
government-and-were-here-help-you-lose-weight_647856.html. The origin of the phrase derives from 
President Ronald Reagan, who once quipped, “[t]he nine most terrifying words in the English language 
are: ‘I’m from the government and I’m here to help.’” Daniel Kurtzman, Ronald Reagan Quotes, 
ABOUT.COM, http://politicalhumor.about.com/cs/quotethis/a/reaganquotes.htm (last visited Nov. 23 
2014). 
